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ABSTRACT
Are All Shares Equal? A Measure of Secondary Agency Conflict and an Examination of
its Influence on Investor Reactions to Acquisition Announcements
By:
Christine Sutton
The separation of ownership and control has been established as the source of primary
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. The research presented in the
chapters that follow explain how the combination of ownership and control also represent
a significant problem for many dispersed shareholders. Prior research has argued that
conflict among principals is pervasive in all types of corporations and may be detrimental
to all the firm’s stakeholders. Scholars have investigated the relationships, but there
existed no comprehensive and validated instrument to analyze the extent of the inequity
among the various firm principals. In the following chapters, a composite measure that
represents the various underlying theoretical constructs related to secondary agency
theory is introduced and validated. The first and second chapters of the research
document explain the theoretical basis of secondary agency conflict along with past
measures employed. The validation process employed to create a Shareholder Inequity
measure is described and a comprehensive index measuring the extent of inequity among
firm owners is formulated. The third chapter explains the follow-up study involving a test
of the newly created Shareholder Inequity measure; an event study of the market reaction
to acquisition announcements by firms with inherent secondary agency problems. This
dissertation has two main objectives. The first objective is to understand the control
vii

differences that exist among shareholders that create opportunities to distort the process
of returning wealth equitably to all firm owners. The second objective is to evaluate how
investors perceived and reacted to the inequities when acquisition activity was
announced; these are situations that are particularly prone to creating agency conflicts of
various types. Objectives were met by explaining the dimensionality of secondary agency
conflicts, validating measures for the dimensions, and confirming the significant
contribution of several of the measures to acquisition announcement returns.
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CHAPTER 1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined agency relationships as contracts between
persons (i.e., principals) who engage other persons (i.e., agents) to perform some service
on their behalves. Since contracts are imperfect, conflicts and related costs may arise
from the misalignment of goals between parties (Grossman & Hart, 1988). The associated
costs only arise when the principal (owner) and the agent (manager) have divergent
interests. When the owner is the sole decision maker for the firm, there are no agency
costs (Ang, Cole, & Lin, 2000). Alternatively, as ownership becomes more diffused and
distanced from management, agency conflicts arise (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). One
proposed governance mechanism to minimize goal incongruence is concentrated
ownership or blockholding (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). While blockholding may be
effective in alleviating primary agency conflicts, secondary agency conflicts may emerge
(Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014). Shareholders or shareholder blocks maintain varying
goals and interests (Bagwell, 1992) which may result in conflict when the goals are not
aligned with other shareholders in an organization (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes,
2000). Goal incongruence becomes problematic when a shareholder or shareholder group
exercises their control (arising primarily from their ownership but also sometimes from
management control) to reap benefits at the expense of other shareholders (Young, Peng,
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Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Table 1 highlights several of the differences between
primary agency and secondary agency1 conflicts.
Table 1: Comparison of Common Primary and Secondary Agency Conflicts
Primary Agency
Secondary Agency
Conflict between owner and manager
Conflict among owners
Stems from separation of ownership and
Stems from varied combinations of
control
ownership and control
Agent vs. Principal
Principal vs. Principal
Studied sporadically in finance, most
Studied extensively in many countries and recently management studies are focused
contexts for almost 40 years
in Asian countries and/or family
businesses
Managers are influenced by the
Managers pursue their own self-interests
preferences of certain shareholders or
shareholder groups
Studies to date are limited to firms with
Studied in all types of companies
certain “types” of owners (e.g., family,
institutional, and government)
Agency relationships between owners and managers have been widely studied
(e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), but the equally important relationship
among firm principals is less researched. Secondary agency problems exist in many firms
regardless of their ownership type, economic environment, or governance structures, but
are most severe in areas with high ownership concentration and few legal protections for
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). As a result, this conflict is most heavily studied in less
developed countries that have government blockholders or owners with political power
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). However, these conflicts also occur and have been
documented in areas with more sophisticated legal environments like Europe and North
America (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Often the conflicts

1

The terms secondary agency (Singla, Veliyath, & George, 2014), type II agency (Villalonga & Amit,
2006), and principal-principal agency (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000) have been used
interchangeably in the business literature to describe conflicts among firm principals. For convenience and
clarity, this dissertation proposal will consistently employ the term secondary agency to define the conflict.
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are not blatant and obvious since the regulatory environments offer greater investor
protections, but some firm decisions are irrational and motivations are clearly
questionable (Young et al., 2008).
A recent example of these questionable decisions that may stem from secondary
agency conflict was the bidding war between the Tyson family, owners of Tyson Foods,
Inc. and Pilgrim’s Pride for the acquisition of Hillshire Farms. Tyson Foods is the largest
prepared foods provider and Hillshire Farms was the eleventh largest causing
shareholders, competitors, activists, and even the Department of Justice concern.
Regardless, the chairman of Tyson’s board of directors, John Tyson, explained in a press
release that Tyson Foods has historically grown through strategic acquisitions and that
the board of directors believe that the decision to acquire Hillshire Farms is a
“transformational opportunity and best fits with our strategic plan while enhancing our
margins and creating long-term shareholder value.” Market analysts were not convinced
and downgraded Tyson’s stock explaining that Tyson was significantly overpaying at the
price of 8.55 billion dollars and substantially increasing their debt levels to finance the
cash acquisition. In fact, Tyson even sold off their operations in Mexico and Brazil to
reduce the debt incurred to fund the acquisition choices (Baertlein, 2014). When
Pilgrim’s Pride announced the withdrawal of its bid for Hillshire Farms, the Pilgrim’s
Pride CEO explained, “as a disciplined acquirer, we determined that it was in the best
interests of our shareholders not to increase our proposed price” (Bunge, 2014). Even
more confusing was the fact that Tyson paid two billion dollars more than Pilgrim Pride’s
last bid (Prior, 2014). While Tyson was engaged in this bidding war their stock
plummeted more than 25%. During that same time period, Pilgrim’s Pride’s stock
increased by almost 20%. So the question that arises is why the Tyson family (which
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owns 99% of the Class B stock that has 10:1 voting rights over other shareholders) was
willing to overpay and take on the additional debt when the actions have destroyed and
will likely continue to destroy firm value (especially for their minority shareholders)?2
Research presented here will provide possible explanations for the actions of firms like
Tyson Foods that pursue inexplicable strategies that result in the destruction of
shareholder value.
As evidenced in the Tyson Foods example, secondary agency conflicts often
destroy shareholder value. Therefore, continued research of the relationships among
principals has been encouraged (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010; Morck,
Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005; Young et al., 2008). In the first chapter of this dissertation,
the objectives and motivations for the research are explained and the existing secondary
agency studies are explored. In the second chapter, constructs that represent various
theoretical aspects of secondary agency are developed and validated. Finally, in the third
chapter, impacts of secondary agency problems in the context of firm acquisitions are
examined and tested.
1.2 OBJECTIVES AND MOTIVATIONS
Secondary agency conflicts among firm principals have been documented in firms
with various types of owners, such as families (Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Villalonga
& Amit, 2010), institutions (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009), and governments (Chen &
Young, 2010). Secondary agency problems are studied in both emerging (Young et al.,
2008) and developed economies (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Additionally, the

2

Family motivations may not have been the only concern for minority shareholders in this particular
acquisition. Blackrock and Vanguard own more than 5% of both Tyson and Hillshire. Research shows that
owners with cross-holdings may be indifferent to the destruction of wealth for acquiring shareholders since
that wealth is transferred to the target and therefore does not affect the cross-holding blockholder’s overall
portfolio (Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010).
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conflicts among principals have been documented on several continents including Asia
(e.g., Singla et al., 2014; Su, Xu, & Phan, 2008; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010), Europe
(e.g., Maury & Pajuste, 2002; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), and North America (e.g.,
Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Villalonga & Amit, 2009).
Secondary agency problems among firm principals occur due to shareholder
heterogeneity – the misalignment of goals and interests among principals (Bagwell, 1992)
– and may result in poor strategic choices such as diversifying acquisitions (Miller et al.,
2010) or lower profitability from purchasing and selling goods at sub-optimal prices to
cronies (Khanna & Rivkin, 2001). Cronyism or “mutual back scratching” represents a
secondary agency problem when controlling owners choose business relationships that
offer private benefits unavailable to all shareholders (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006).
Additionally, company growth may stagnate if controlling owners are entrenched or riskaverse and do not pursue profitable opportunities (Miller, Le-Breton Miller, & Scholnick,
2008). Further, since firm information is publicly available, investors recognize and
account for secondary agency conflicts by demanding higher dividends (more cash) to
offset the disadvantages of less control (Ferris, Kim, & Kitsabunnarat, 2003). The higher
dividends result in greater costs of capital and lower firm valuations for firms with
intense secondary agency problems (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001; Lins, 2003).
While secondary agency conflicts are widely considered a problem for minority
shareholders, the consequences of secondary agency problems extend to other
stakeholders of a corporation as well. Secondary agency conflicts affect the employees of
a corporation through practices such as nepotism (Chrisman et al., 2004). For example,
family firms may hire or promote less qualified family members resulting in lower
employee morale (Miller, Lee, Chang, & Le Breton-Miller, 2009). Firms may damage
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relationships with suppliers or distributors by purchasing supplies and materials at abovemarket prices from organizations owned by, or associated with, controlling shareholders
or by selling products and services at below-market prices to the same cronies (Khanna &
Rivkin, 2001). Additionally, secondary agency problems may become a societal concern
when power is so heavily concentrated that the financial markets are distorted and capital
is allocated inefficiently in the economy (Morck et al., 2005). In the most severe
instances concentrated control may extend into the political arena affecting the standard
of living for all stakeholders (Young et al., 2008). Thus, identifying and measuring
secondary agency problems is important for all stakeholders (including shareholders) of a
corporation.
The review of the literature on secondary agency problems presented in the next
section, 1.3, identified that a wide range of disciplines recognize the conflicts and their
consequences for corporate governance practices (Young et al., 2008). Kim, Kim, and
Lee (2008) posit that some combination of outside investors, national governance, and
firm-level governance could reduce the conflicts among principals. Firm value is tied to
internal and external governance mechanisms (Brown & Caylor, 2006) and the various
practices often substitute for one another (Rediker & Seth, 1995). The most efficient
bundle of governance mechanisms may vary systemically at different levels and therefore
some studies have investigated secondary agency conflict at the industry, state, or country
level (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 2000; Ward & Filatotchev, 2010). While recognition of the multi-level impacts
and problems stemming from secondary issues is important, this study is limited to
examining only firm level secondary agency problems. Country level measures of
shareholder protection (which have little within-country variation) do not provide as
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much insight into secondary agency costs occurring at the firm level (La Porta et al.,
2000).
The absence of consistency in the definitions and measurement of secondary
agency problems represents a gap in the governance literature. While researchers agree
that conflicts among principals exist, the terminology and definitions vary. For example,
Young et al. (2008, p. 196) explain that, “Principal–principal conflicts between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders result from concentrated ownership,
extensive family ownership and control, business group structures, and weak legal
protection of minority shareholders.” This definition is limiting since conflicts among
principals exist in countries with a strong legal system as well (Barclay & Holderness,
1992; Morck & Yeung, 2004; Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Alternatively, the extant
literature on secondary agency issues defines the problem as, “the misalignment of goals
among majority and minority shareholders that results in the expropriation of minority
shareholders’ wealth” (Singla et al., 2014, p. 607). In order to legitimize phenomena and
constructs, a consistent definition is necessary (Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008). A
consistent definition should reference the various dimensions of a construct so that
antecedents and consequences may be more fully understood (Short, Moss, & Lumpkin,
2009). In order to reference the various dimensions of secondary agency conflict, they
must first be identified and empirically analyzed. Therefore, future governance studies
would be strengthened by defining the various dimensions and consistently measuring the
proposed constructs across multiple instances (Boyd, Gove, & Hitt, 2005). Additionally,
consistent measurement of observed phenomena allows for comparisons across studies
and facilitates theory development (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently, this essay surveys
and assesses the extant literature and prior measures employed in the study of secondary
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agency problems. Then, additional potential measures, that detect the scope and the
domain of the conflict among principals, are suggested. Finally, building on theory and
past literature, a valid and generalizable index of the extent of inequity among
shareholders is constructed and tested.
There have been a limited number of empirical studies on secondary agency
problems and most of these studies used particular situations or proxy measures to show
evidence of the issue. Proxies employed for secondary agency problems include
ownership measures such as concentration and type (Dahya, Dimitrov, & McConnell,
2008; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009) and board measures like compensation,
size, and proportion of independent directors (Su et al., 2008). However, proxies provide
researchers with relatively little assurance that an observed phenomenon is measured
reliably (Boyd et al., 2005). Other streams of literature examined the extent of private
benefits consumed by blockholders at the expense of minority shareholders by
quantifying the premium paid for large-percentage blocks of shares (Barclay &
Holderness, 1989) and comparing share prices of dual class shares (Zingales, 1995).
Since large block trades are infrequent events and the majority of firms do not have
multiple share classes (Zingales, 1995), these methods are often not applicable.
Researchers have “strongly encouraged the application of more indexes and scales
in strategic management research” (Boyd et al., 2005, p. 252). The literature review of
secondary agency problems revealed that only one paper to date has employed any
validated index to measure secondary agency problems (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012).3
The conflict index proposed by Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) was tested and applied
at the country-level for European firms. Renders and Gaeremynck (2012, p.128) explain
3

The literature review process is explained further in a later section.
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that their measure includes “an extensive set of variables shown to be linked with the
severity of agency problems.” They did not explain that secondary agency problems have
different dimensions or that the neutrality of firm directors exacerbates the conflict.
Instead, the authors noted that the various measures included had been used before
independently and were now used in combination through a principal factor analysis that
reduced five correlated measures into one factor, labeled conflict (Renders &
Gaeremynck, 2012).
In comparison, the present research studies the conflict at the firm level in the
United States by identifying the various theoretically supportable dimensions of
secondary agency conflict and incorporating multiple variables to represent each of the
dimensions. New constructs that characterize the different dimensions were introduced,
defined, and tested, including a construct representing the neutrality of the board of
directors that was not addressed in Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict measure.
The constructs in this study were factor analyzed to create a theoretical measurement
model. Once the measurement model was developed, a confirmatory factor analysis was
performed to validate the proposed structure. The PLS-SEM testing provided a more
detailed and comprehensive view of the relationships among the underlying dimensions
in addition to the creation of a composite index of secondary agency problems.
While the newly developed secondary agency constructs shall add value to many
studies of strategic firm behavior, the first test of the measures was performed in the
context of firm acquisitions through an event study (Brown & Warner, 1980), as shown
in Chapter 3. Event studies offer researchers the opportunity to isolate and evaluate
market reactions to announcements (Brown & Warner, 1985). Acquisitions are
discretionary strategic decisions that require major resource commitments and have been
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studied extensively in the context of primary agency conflicts (Eisenhardt, 1989; Tosi &
Gomez-Mejia, 1989). When primary agency problems exist, investors in the acquiring
firm often react negatively to announced acquisitions because they question the
motivations for the decision since acquisitions often reduce value (Masulis, Wang, &
Xie, 2007). Acquisition activities are also a suitable context for the study of secondary
agency problems since this type of firm growth offers certain shareholders opportunities
to enjoy benefits unavailable to other firm owners (Goranova, Dharwadkar, & Brandes,
2010). Examples of these private benefits include personal portfolio diversification
(Miller et al., 2010) and greater power and influence (Chen & Young, 2010). An event
study of firm acquisition announcements offers an immediate and measureable reaction
to the extent of secondary agency conflict in a firm. Negative investor reactions, captured
by abnormal stock returns around the time of the announcement, provide evidence that
minority shareholders believe that the controlling shareholders’ strategic choices will
reduce firm value (Chen & Young, 2010). Since prior research has demonstrated that
blockholders engage in strategies which advance personal, family, or political agendas at
the expense of the firm (Denis & Sarin, 1999) and that the market accounts for the
strategies (Paul, 2007; Schijven & Hitt, 2012), the event study was expected to provide
further insights into secondary agency conflicts.
A limited number of studies have explored problems among certain types of
principals surrounding acquisition activities, but they do not encompass all facets of
secondary agency problems (e.g., Chen & Young, 2010; Goranova et al., 2010; Miller et
al., 2010). Ownership blockholdings that have been studied in acquisition contexts
include family (Miller et al., 2010), institution (Goranova et al., 2010), and government
(Chen & Young, 2010). Studying different blocks of owners offers examples of
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secondary agency conflict, but the minority shareholders must also be considered to fully
assess the magnitude of inequity among all firm owners. The selective sampling on the
basis of ownership type has left a gap in secondary agency research. The following
studies employed samples of publicly listed U.S. firms with varying ownership and
control structures so that the findings are more generalizable. Additionally, the constructs
offer a more complete picture of various secondary agency conflicts within firms since
each underlying domain is explored and measured separately and in combination.
Therefore, this research offers insights to both the governance and strategy research
streams.
The remainder of the chapter provides a review of the theory and literature related
to secondary agency problems.
1.3 AGENCY LITERATURE REVIEW
Agency problems were first identified by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The
agency relationship is expressed as a contract between two entities that specifies the
rights and both implicit and explicit behaviors expected of various interested parties
within a firm. This nexus-of-contracts view, inspired by Coase (1937), includes
employees, customers, suppliers, investors, governmental entities, as well as other
stakeholders who provide some assets or resources in return for some expected gains.
Stakeholder theory suggests that each of the individual explicit and implicit contracts
should be recognized and fulfilled (Donaldson & Preston, 1995).
From a purely economic perspective, the contracts would also be sufficient to
protect minority shareholders. Theoretically, to reduce the cost of capital, those in control
of firm decisions that are seeking capital would bind themselves to investors through
contracts that limit the possibility of shareholder expropriation (Jensen & Meckling,

12
1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). If the binding contracts were systematically enforced, no
regulations would be required. However, in practice, the firm decision makers often do
not create such contracts voluntarily, since the first order effect would be a reduction in
expropriation opportunities that may be profitable for the decision makers. In many firms
with dominant shareholders, owners bear the burden of managing the firm’s operations.
The dominant shareholders (or groups) may rationalize the expropriation by considering
it a “reimbursement” for the additional costs incurred. The value of the reimbursement to
controlling shareholders is often referred to as the private benefits of control (Barclay &
Holderness, 1989).
Expropriation of firm value has consequences that may even extend to a nation’s
economy (Morck et al., 2005). Therefore, laws are often established to protect minority
shareholders by causing expropriation to be less convenient or efficient. As investor
protection improves through legal means, expropriation becomes much more timeconsuming and costly. Therefore, blockholders would need to systematically engage in
more challenging diversionary practices such as setting up intermediary companies into
which they could channel profits (LaPorta et al., 2000). When investor protection laws
are even more thorough and the board of directors is functioning as required by these
laws, the most blockholders could accomplish is excessive perquisite consumption or
undue influence over strategic decisions that may not be in the best interest of all
shareholders. Additionally, blockholders may be fearful of future legal or financial
consequences stemming from expropriation. Interpretations and expansions of the current
laws may occur if the public or the court system perceives unfairness among owners
(Millon, 1990). However, the effectiveness of legal protections to prevent agency conflict
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is limited, since courts cannot account for all individual firm-level initiatives and
variations (La Porta et al., 2000).
While there is an ongoing debate among scholars concerning the purpose of a
corporation (Stout, 2002) and the rights of stakeholders that are not owners (Donaldson &
Preston, 1995), firms should treat all shareholders equally (Millon, 1990). Traditional
agency solutions do not promote equitable treatment among shareholders (Dharwadkar et
al., 2000). Managerial incentives and owner monitoring are much less effective when the
conflicts are among the various principals. The shareholder conflicts often stem from the
differing preferences and goals of the various owners and become problematic when the
large shareholders abuse their ownership percentages to reap benefits unavailable to all
shareholders.
In the following sections the underlying areas of secondary agency problems are
explored. The dimensions of secondary agency conflict were identified through an
extensive review of relevant legal, finance, accounting, and management literatures. The
goal of the literature review was to identify potential measures of the conflict among
principals. Employing both key word searches (e.g., principal-principal, secondary
agency, type II agency, agency cost measures, agency cost indices) and manual searches
of leading journals (e.g., Strategic Management Journal, Journal of Finance, Journal of
Management Studies, Journal of Management, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal
of Law and Economics, American Economic Review, Academy of Management Journal,
Academy of Management Review, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Accounting
and Economics), potentially relevant research was compiled for review. The review
process resulted in the identification of multiple domains of secondary agency conflict.
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Each theoretical component associated with secondary agency conflict is presented in
table form (Tables 2-5) and then further explained in the following section.
1.3.1 Organizational Slack and Secondary Agency Conflict
Table 2: Theoretical Basis for the Organizational Slack Construct
Author(s)
Relevant Major Findings
Shareholders are heterogeneous and therefore prefer
Bagwell (1992)
different allocations of a firm’s slack resources.
Barclay & Holderness
Block trades are priced at a premium, especially for firms
(1989)
with large cash holdings.
Bushee (1998)
Different investors prefer different levels of R&D and
Bushee & Noe (2000)
pressure managers to comply with their preferences.
Organizational slack was introduced and defined as the
Cyert & March (1963)
difference between available and committed resources.
Daniel et al. (2004)
The slack-performance relationship varies by industry.
Edmans (2013)
Excess cash allows for more efficient expropriation.
Dividend payouts limit expropriation because they remove
Faccio et al. (2001)
corporate wealth from the control of the majority
shareholder.
Dividends signal the severity of the conflict between the
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003)
large controlling owners and the small outside owners.
There exists a positive relationship between the level of
Hill & Snell (1988)
stock concentration and R&D investments for U.S. firms
due to lower information asymmetry.
Organizational slack is harmful from an agency
Jensen (1986)
perspective.
Distinguishing among different owners is instrumental in
Kim et al. (2008)
enhancing understanding of the relationship between
ﬁnancial slack and R&D investments.
Minority shareholders can protect their interests by
La Porta et al. (2000)
demanding cash payouts (dividends).
The expectations of investors, their concern with stock
Lee & O'Neil (2003)
prices, and their holding periods can affect R&D
investments.
Outside shareholders often prefer dividends over retained
Maury & Pajuste (2002)
earnings.
Zahra & Filatotchev
Information asymmetry complicates the relationship
(2004)
between ownership and R&D.

Table 2 summarizes various contributions to establishing the theoretical links
between preferences concerning the allocation of slack resources and secondary agency
conflicts. The following section explains the relationships more completely. According to
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Cyert and March (1963), slack is the difference between the resources available to the
organization and the payments required to maintain the organization. Past studies have
explained the benefits of slack resources; such as greater autonomy and flexibility
(Daniel, Lohrke, Fornaciari, & Turner, 2004) and the presence of a “safety net” for
unexpected threats (Cyert & March, 1963); but too much slack breeds inefficiency,
inhibits risk taking, and hurts performance (Jensen, 1986). From an agency theoretic
perspective, slack is the source of agency problems and no governance would be
necessary but for the existence of slack resources (Castaner & Kavadis, 2013). Therefore,
while exploring the differing preferences for slack resources as a source of secondary
agency conflict, the concern is not centered around the ideal level of slack for a firm, but
instead how to allocate slack in an equitable way for all shareholders in the organization.
Bourgeois and Singh (1983) explained that slack may be categorized as available (e.g.,
excess liquidity), recoverable (e.g., overhead expenditures) or potential (e.g., borrowing
capacity) slack. While shareholders maintain differing preferences for all types of slack
resources, available slack, also known as unabsorbed slack, will be the focus in the
present research since it is the type most often measured in agency theoretic studies due
to its highly discretionary nature (Kim et al., 2008).
Shareholders are heterogeneous in their goals for their investment in a firm
(Bagwell, 1992) and therefore maintain different preferences concerning the allocation of
slack resources. Organizational Slack preferences vary because shareholders maintain
different risk profiles, term orientations, and financial goals for their association with the
organization (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Some shareholders may also have the power to
influence or control firm strategy, as explained in subsequent sections, but secondary
agency conflict would not exist without the varying preferences for the allocation of slack
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resources (Singla et al., 2014). Relevant and differing preferences for slack resources that
have been identified in secondary agency conflict studies are dividend payout ratios
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), research and development intensity (Kim et al., 2008),
and financial slack levels (Kim et al., 2008). Further explanations and examples of each
preference are provided in the following paragraphs.
Several studies documented a negative relationship between blockholding and
dividend payout ratios (Faccio et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2000; Maury & Pajuste, 2002).
The findings suggest that higher dividend payouts limit expropriation because dividends
remove corporate wealth from the control of the large shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001).
As a consequence, minority shareholders may have a preference for dividends over
retained earnings. When no vigilant oversight or recourse exists, large shareholders may
exploit minority shareholders’ portion of the firm’s undistributed wealth by stealing or reallocating profits (La Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, minority shareholders in high
protection countries can protect their interests by demanding cash distributions (La Porta
et al., 2000). Consistent with this argument, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) found evidence
that the relationship between dividend reduction announcements and negative stock price
reactions was intensified among companies in which the ownership and control structures
made the expropriation of minority shareholder’s interests more likely.
Research and development (R&D) is an integral but risky component of corporate
strategy. Originally, under primary agency theory, a positive relationship was found to
exist between the level of stock concentration and R&D investments (Hill & Snell, 1988).
But, shareholders are heterogeneous with varying risk profiles and differing preferences
for the intensity and scope of research and development initiatives. For instance,
“transient” institutional owners are more likely to pressure ﬁrms to cut R&D spending to
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meet short-term earnings goals whereas the opposite is true for “dedicated” institutional
owners (Bushee, 1998). Ownership pressure may cause firms to shift their strategic goals
to align with certain shareholder’s expectations for holding period returns (Bushee &
Noe, 2000; Lee & O’Neil, 2003). In one test of conflicting preferences, evidence was
provided that family ownership moderates the relationship between slack resources and
R&D investment differently than institutional or foreign ownership (Kim et al., 2008).
Therefore, differing shareholder preferences may influence strategic R&D investment
decisions in ways that are not necessarily in the best interest of all shareholders.
A separate but relevant reason for conflicts regarding R&D priorities stems from
information asymmetry among shareholders. Some controlling owners may be hesitant to
trust and share sensitive information about research and development with professional
managers and outside investors to protect firm-specific knowledge about capabilities and
processes from competitors (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). Information asymmetry
concerning the value of a project may lead to differing shareholder perceptions.
Inefficient uses of limited resources (even when the inefficiency is only perceived) may
lead to conflicts among shareholders that result in the destruction of value.
Agency theory predicts negative repercussions for shareholders when firms have
excess financial slack since these assets are highly discretionary (Jensen, 1986). In early
studies, Barclay and Holderness (1989) documented premium pricing for negotiated
block trades. The premium pricing reflected the private benefits of control from holding
large blocks of a firm’s equity. Block trades that involved firms with larger amounts of
discretionary slack were associated with higher premiums. Edmans (2013) suggests these
findings offer evidence that retaining discretionary slack is an efficient way to
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. While there may be differing risk
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tolerances and preferences among shareholders concerning the levels of discretionary
cash holdings (Bagwell, 1992), slack is most equitably allocated when paid out to
shareholders in the form of dividend since expropriation is not possible when slack does
not exist (Faccio et al., 2001). However, while each shareholder may have heterogeneous
preferences for cash flows, they can only influence policy if they hold enough power
(Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). One way that owners achieve the necessary power is
through block ownership as summarized in Table 3 and further explained in the following
section.
1.3.2 Blockholder Power and Secondary Agency Conflict
Table 3: Theoretical Basis for the Blockholder Power Construct
Author(s)
Relevant Major Findings
Barclay & Holderness
Significant private benefits of control are obtained
(1989)
through block trade pricing.
Barclay & Holderness
Private benefit consumption drives the decision to hold
(1992)
blocks of stock.
Firms may choose strategies to recruit specific
Bushee (2004)
blockholders.
Some investors choose firms with specific traits while
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach
others attempt to influence firms to align with their
(2009)
preferences.
Cronqvist & Nilsson
Controlling shareholders set strategy, appoint board
(2003)
members, and have opportunities to extract wealth.
Gugler & Yurtoglu (2003) A second blockholder increases monitoring.
The number of large blockholders in a firm may explain
Maury & Pajuste (2002),
the choice majority owners make between adopting a
(2005)
monitoring or colluding role.
Shareholder preferences for slack have been shown to be related to block
ownership in multiple ways. Research suggests that ownership is not just a driver of
strategy; instead it is also an outcome of strategic choices. For example, Bushee (2004)
shows evidence of executives choosing strategies to attract certain blockholders.
Research also found that investors may systematically select investments with certain
policies while others attempt to actively influence and impact policies (Cronqvist &
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Fahlenbrach, 2009). While monitoring and activism may create additional value for
shareholders, it may also allow blockholders to pursue private benefits. Therefore
minority shareholders experience a trade-off and the net benefit (loss) for minority
shareholders varies (Tribo, Berrone, & Surroca, 2007). In situations where a dominant
shareholder influences policy to create benefits unavailable to all owners, a secondary
agency problem exists.
Secondary agency problems become most pronounced when ownership is
concentrated and that powerful individual or group also controls the strategic direction of
a firm (Singla et al., 2014). The additional rewards for concentrated ownership in blocks,
also called private benefits of control, are the financial and non-financial gains that large
shareholders beget, through their decision making power, at the expense of small
shareholders (Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Misappropriation of minority shareholders’
rights represents an important secondary agency problem among principals. It conflicts
with a central premise of modern financial theory that each shareholder receives benefits
in proportion to their ownership concentration (Jensen & Warner, 1988). Barclay and
Holderness (1989) theorized that the value of private benefits of voting control is best
measured by analyzing the pricing of block trades as represented by the exchange prices
when compared to the market value. The authors found a discrepancy of 20% between
the block trades and exchange pricing. The value of the significant divergence
represented the extent of private benefits of control stemming from ownership
concentration, and is therefore a secondary agency problem.
Blockholders have an incentive to improve firm management and therefore
increase the value of all shares, while at the same time consuming corporate resources to
the exclusion of minority shareholders (Barclay & Holderness, 1992). The additional
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private benefits of control explain the decision to purchase blocks of ownership.
Similarly, controlling shareholders face a cost-benefit analysis when deciding whether to
collude with other blockholders, whether to monitor or whether to remain passive. When
there is only a single large shareholder or shareholding group, the blockholders have the
ability to determine the ﬁrm’s strategy, appoint board members, and extract wealth
(Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). There exist mixed findings related to firm value in the
presence of a second large shareholder, thus demonstrating the potential either for greater
monitoring (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003) or for colluding (Maury & Pajuste, 2002).
However, Maury and Pajuste (2005) confirm a positive relationship with firm value in the
presence of a third strong blockholder. In a model with a third blockholder, the marginal
costs are higher than the marginal benefits from the expropriation of minority
shareholders and the diversion of resources is less efficient (and therefore more costly)
for the first two blockholders (Maury & Pajuste, 2005).
Blockholding is a source of power, but ownership has greater influence when it is
combined with control (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Singla et al., 2014). Owners who
are not directly involved as managers or directors in the firm must find different ways,
like for example shareholder activism, to exert control in order to extract private benefits
(Smith, 1996). Alternatively, blockholders may be directly involved in firm management
or they may serve on the board of directors (Holderness, 2003). These blockholders may
more easily extract private benefits and influence strategy since they are directly involved
in firm decisions and therefore maintain both ownership and control (Hoi & Robin,
2010). The sources of control are summarized in Table 4 and further explored in the
following section.
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1.3.3 Differential Control and Secondary Agency Conflict
Table 4: Theoretical Basis for the Differential Control Construct
Author(s)
Relevant Major Findings
When private benefits of control are large, founders
Bebchuk (1999)
will retain control through dual class shares when they
take their firms public.
The board of directors is easily circumvented when
Dharwadkar et al. (2000)
ownership and managerial control are combined.
Dual class share structures have detrimental effects at
Faccio & Lang (2002)
the country level as well.
Grossman & Hart (1988);
Firms that have dual class shares are undervalued.
Harris & Raviv (1988)
Firm value is reduced when controlling owners are
Hoi & Robin (2010)
close to managers.
Any departure from “one share-one vote” may affect
Jensen & Warner (1988)
the wealth of all shareholders.
Lin, Ma, Malatesta, &
Control wedge has significant economic consequences
Xuan (2011)
(costs of debt) for all shareholders.
Renders & Gaeremynck
Dual class shares and the control wedge created
(2012)
represent the extent of conflict among shareholders.
When a controlling shareholder has a low cash flow
Shleifer & Wolfenzon
stake, the cost of capital to the firm is high since other
(2002)
investors anticipate expropriation and pay depressed
prices for any securities that the firm sells.
The third theoretical area of secondary agency conflict explains the differential
controls among owners and is summarized in Table 4. As described in the preceding
section, some blockholders are limited in their ability to influence strategy without
support from managers and board members. Alternatively, when owners are also
managers or directors they have disproportionate control for their ownership stake
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Often, research that explores secondary agency conflict
finds increased effects when ownership and control are combined (Singla et al., 2014).
For example, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) document greater blockholder influence
on firm mergers and acquisitions (M&A), dividends, and executive compensation
policies when the blockholder is also a board member or an officer in the firm. The
“proximity” of an owner, defined as the controlling owner’s relationship with the firm
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and management, also affects firm value (Hoi & Robin, 2010). Additionally, the agents
(top managers) may also represent the controlling shareholders, and therefore they could
circumvent monitoring by the boards of directors (Dharwadkar et al., 2000).
An additional source of differential control is a dual class equity structure.
Typically, a dual class share structure includes a publicly traded “inferior” class of stock
that allows for one vote per share and a non-publicly traded “superior” class of stock with
greater voting rights per share (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2010). Research has shown
this share structure to be more prevalent when private benefits are high and the related
perceived costs are low (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002; Gompers et al., 2010). Jensen and
Warner (1988) examined how patterns of stock ownership can influence firm value and
efficiency. The authors argued that any departure from “one share-one vote” may affect
the wealth of all shareholders. The problem of undervaluation of firms with dual class
shares, a security design that offers different shares with distinct voting rights and
dividend payments, has been confirmed empirically (Grossman & Hart, 1988; Harris &
Raviv, 1988). Additionally, Faccio and Lang (2002) found that shareholder conflict is
intensified when voting and cash ﬂow rights are separated. A separation of voting and
cash ﬂow rights is detrimental to all shareholders since the wedge between control and
cash flow signals expropriation opportunities for investors, and therefore depresses share
prices (Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002).
While the existence of dual class shares signals conflict among shareholders, the
size of the wedge between the cash ﬂow rights and the voting rights of blockholders is
also economically significant (Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011). Research indicates an
increase in secondary agency conflict when the largest shareholder’s voting rights exceed
their cash ﬂow rights (Bebchuk, 1999). Renders and Gaeremynck (2012, p.130) posit,
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“the larger the voting rights of the largest shareholder, the greater is his ability to extract
wealth from the company; the lower his cash ﬂow rights, the lower are the costs he incurs
from extracting wealth from the company.” Consequently, both the existence of dual
class shares and the size of the wedge created signal potential expropriation opportunities
and therefore represent the presence of secondary agency conflicts within a firm.
Shareholders of a corporation rely on the board of directors to identify the
problems and control expropriation within the firm by monitoring firm choices
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Board members may have special interests that interfere with
their objectivity in monitoring as summarized in Table 5 and further explained in the
following section.
1.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality and Secondary Agency Conflict
Table 5: Theoretical Basis for the Absence of Board Neutrality Construct
Author(s)
Relevant Major Findings
Independent directors may represent an important line of
defense that minority shareholders can employ in
Anderson & Reeb (2004)
protecting themselves against opportunism by large
shareholders.
Directors in public firms have discretion to honor various
Blair & Stout (1999)
owner preferences.
Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach Blockholders have a greater influence on strategy when
(2009)
they also are officers or board members.
Dominant shareholders could raise the value of their
Dahya et al. (2008)
firms by appointing more independent boards.
Deutsch, Keil, &
Directors are powerful and have their own motivations
Laamanen
for serving on a board of directors.
(2011)
Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, Ownership representation on the board drives innovation
& Grossman (2002)
strategy.
Owners and their representatives on the board drive or at
Ravasi & Zattoni (2006)
least modify strategy and conflict.
Board independence enhances ﬁrm value and the
performance impact of board independence is stronger in
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009)
closely-held ﬁrms and/or ﬁrms having low dividend
payouts.
Controlling shareholders can decide who is on the board
Young et al. (2008)
of directors. This effectively nullifies a board’s ability to
oversee the controlling shareholders. Recourse is limited.
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Another source of inequity stems from the composition of the board of directors.
Shareholders that have disproportionate control may have the ability to suggest or even
determine board members (Young et al., 2008). While board representation does not
assure control over the entire board, owners serving on the board themselves or placing a
delegate on the board may strengthen their influence on firm strategy. Both the
composition of a firm’s board of directors and the concentration of power in top
management have been recognized and studied as primary agency problems (Aggarwal,
Erel, Stulz, & Williamson, 2010; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003). In addition, within
some types of ownership structures such as family controlled firms, research has also
begun to empirically examine board composition in a secondary agency context
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009).
One source of concern is the concentration of power in the firm’s CEO. The
concentration is frequently termed duality in the primary agency literature and describes
situations when the CEO is also the chairman of the board (Boyd, 1995). Since secondary
agency problems focus on conflict among owners, the concentration of power is
expanded to include a third source of influence in the form of blockholding. From a
secondary agency perspective, a blockholding CEO may have fewer opportunities to
expropriate wealth when an independent chair is monitoring the CEO’s activity (Singla et
al., 2014). In an empirical test of various blockholder combinations, Sacristán-Navarro,
Gómez-Ansón, & Cabeza-García (2011) found reduced profitability for firms with family
blockholders as the CEO or chairman. Additionally, concentration of ownership in
management and on boards has been shown to misalign the risk preferences of various
categories of owners. For example, manager-blockholders pursue international
diversification, which is often profitable for shareholders with diverse portfolios, less
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frequently (Alessandri & Seth, 2014) and business diversification, which is often less
profitable for shareholders with diverse portfolios, more frequently (Miller et al., 2010).
Expropriation of value by blockholders may also occur through influencing board
composition decisions. In extreme cases, controlling shareholders can determine the
entire board of directors, effectively nullifying a board’s ability to oversee those
shareholders (Young et al., 2008). More frequently, large shareholders may have one or
more board members that represent their particular interests in the firm (Ravasi &
Zattoni, 2006). Additionally, directors of publicly listed firms have an “extraordinary
degree of discretion to pursue other agendas and to favor other constituencies” (Blair &
Stout, 1999, p. 252).
Like dual class shares, a lack of board neutrality may create expropriation
concerns for minority shareholders. Prior research explains that outside directors are
“powerful individuals, present or former CEOs, representatives of institutional
blockholders, or top professionals that have their own individual motives as members of
the board” (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen, 2011, p. 211). Ravasi and Zattoni (2006)
examined a political perspective of board behavior in a qualitative study and found that
the heterogeneous interests of various shareholder representatives often drove or
modified proposed strategies, accounting for the majority of board conflict.
Board independence, usually a theoretical component of primary agency, has been
modified and studied in a secondary agency framework. For example, Setia-Atmaja et al.
(2009) studied family firms and confirmed that board independence enhances ﬁrm value
and that the enhancement effect is stronger in firms that are more prone to secondary
agency conflicts. Board independence in Setia-Atmaja et al.’s (2009) study referred to
board members’ independence from the controlling family, instead of the traditionally
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employed primary agency measure of board independence from management.
Additionally, empirical research established that dominant shareholders could raise the
value of their firms by appointing “strong” boards to signal a commitment to refraining
from expropriation (Dahya et al., 2008). Another study included a three-tier system of
independence (independent, affiliated, or insiders) from the controlling family (Anderson
& Reeb, 2004). Independent directors had no identifiable or disclosed relationships with
the controlling blocks. Affiliated directors had business relationships while the insider
category included family members and firm employees. Their research showed that
directors not affiliated with the family represented an important line of defense that
minority shareholders could employ to gain power relative to family shareholders to
protect their interests (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Regardless of the nomenclature
employed (i.e., independent, strong, unaffiliated), it is clear that the neutrality (or lack
thereof) of the firm’s directors in the consideration of all shareholders’ interests may also
serve as a significant indicator of the extent of secondary agency conflict within a firm.
1.4 CONCLUSION
Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) sought to advance secondary agency literature
by creating an index for the measurement of secondary agency problems. Their measure
built on existing theory and their findings employing the index indicated the existence of
secondary agency conflicts in their sample of firms. Their index was termed a conflict
index and included the percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder as well
as the holdings of the second largest shareholder, a dummy variable for dual class shares,
a dummy variable for the blockholder voting/cash flow rights, and the percentage of
dividends paid. The measure developed in Chapter 2 includes indicators from Renders
and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index plus additional measures that are considered
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more representative of the complex underlying theoretical domains of secondary agency
problems discussed in the preceding sections.
Thus, the next chapter in this dissertation focuses on the development of
constructs that represent the dimensions of secondary agency problems. Each component
of shareholder conflict will be defined and motivated by the relevant literature. As
explained in the next chapter, varying preferences for the allocation of slack resources
combined with ownership blocks, control, and a board that is not neutral is inequitable for
minority shareholders and results in destruction of firm value. Factor analysis will be
used to group the constituent variables, employed in prior literature as proxies or
measures of the severity of secondary agency conflicts, into first order constructs. Then,
using second order confirmatory factor analysis, the first order reflective constructs will
be refined and validated into a single formative measure of Shareholder Inequity. The
resulting Shareholder Inequity construct will be a combination of the underlying
theoretical domains of secondary agency conflict that have been identified in prior
research and witnessed in the strategic choices of publicly listed corporations.
After the Shareholder Inequity construct is created in Chapter 2, the new measure
will be employed in Chapter 3 to test investor perceptions of secondary agency problems
manifested in the acquisition decisions of publicly listed companies in the United States.
Acquisition activity has been studied extensively in the literature, but with inconclusive
results (e.g., Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Bae, Kang, & Kim, 2002; Brauer, 2006; Carper,
1990). Secondary agency conflict was found to account for and explain some of the
observed variations in shareholder value maximization (or value destruction) that
occurred in reaction to acquisition announcements. The third chapter explores how the
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conflicting shareholder motivations influence strategic choices resulting in destruction of
shareholder wealth.
Prior studies of conflict among firm principals and acquisition activity have
focused on the motivations of particular types of blockholders. For instance, Chen and
Young (2010) studied Chinese government owners, Goranova et al. (2010) studied
institutional owners and Miller et al. (2010) studied family owners in an acquisition
context. The research presented in Chapter 3 explains the relationships between
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR),4 representative of investor reactions to the strategic
decision, and each underlying theoretical area of secondary agency problems (i.e.,
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board
Neutrality). In addition, the relationships between secondary agency conflicts and
diversifying acquisitions were explored. The goal of the acquisition announcement event
study was to obtain a more robust view of the equitability of returns accruing to firm
shareholders in the context of firm acquisitions. This goal was achieved as explained in
Chapter 3.

4

Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) represent the market reaction that is different from the normal
market trend for a particular firm. The abnormal stock return is recorded each day surrounding a particular
event and then summed to isolate and evaluate the market’s reaction (Brown & Warner, 1980).

CHAPTER 2
2.1 PAPER ONE ABSTRACT
The following chapter continues the exploration of the dimensions and past
measurements of secondary agency conflicts among principals in a firm. First, the
underlying theoretical areas (Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential
Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality) of secondary agency problems identified in
Chapter 1 are discussed further and specific measures for each of the areas are defined
and explained. Then, a theoretically based second order model is introduced and tested
for significance, validity, and reliability. The results of the PLS-SEM testing provide
evidence that the theoretical dimensions of secondary agency problems have been
correctly identified in the Shareholder Inequity model. The new model provides a
comprehensive and appropriate measure of secondary agency problems and the
underlying dimensions so that future governance studies have the ability to incorporate
consistent definitions and measurements.
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2.2 SPECIFIC MEASUREMENT LITERATURE REVIEW
Publicly traded corporations are unique legal entities that are owned by a variety
of shareholders with many different goals for their investments in the corporation
(Bagwell, 1992). The various ownership positions may include individual shareholders or
shareholder blocks that contain family members, employees (i.e., insiders), other
corporations, banks/mutual funds, or other types of interest groups (Cronqvist &
Fahlenbrach, 2009). Each block and even each shareholder may have different objectives
that can sometimes be conflicting. The conflict affects firm value when minority
shareholders believe that other shareholders with disproportionate control are
expropriating the firm’s wealth (Hoskisson et al., 2002). The conflicts have been
substantiated theoretically and empirically, but the extent of the inequity among
shareholders has not been measured in a systematic way across disciplines. The following
section identifies the different ways that these conflicts have been measured in the prior
literature, differentiates between measures of primary and secondary agency problems,
and discusses the improvements over past measurements that this study identifies.
Primary agency problems have been measured in many ways. Research identifies
primary agency problems with proxies like cash levels relative to the industry (Leary &
Roberts, 2010), Tobin’s Q (Leary & Roberts, 2010), selling and general administrative
costs/sales (Singh & Davidson, 2003), the ratio of total debt to total assets and the
percentage of shares held by officers and directors (Krishnan & Ye, 2005). Additionally,
Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) used a measure of direct agency costs, calculated as the
difference in dollar expenses between a firm with less than 100% owner-management and
a firm with 100% owner-management (standardized by annual sales) to capture perquisite
consumption. Based on the distinction, multiple scholars began to create additive indices
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to identify primary agency costs (Aggarwal et al., 2010; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Durnev
& Kim, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004). Both theoretically and
empirically, each of the primary agency studies has provided evidence of conflicts
between owners and managers.
In order to reduce primary agency conflict, firms began to provide ownership
stakes to managers in an attempt to align the goals of both managers and shareholders
and to maximize shareholder wealth (Ofek & Yermack, 2000). However, the benefits
gained from incurring these costs varied since all shareholders do not maintain identical
utility and risk preferences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia,
1998). Additionally, new conflicts emerged from creating ownership groups that (due to
their privileged positions) now had disproportionate control over firm resources. As
compared to primary agency costs, differing shareholder preferences are the basis of
secondary agency conflict and can be problematic for all stakeholders in an organization.
Measurement of secondary agency conflicts has been inconsistent in the literature to date.
Research has measured the extent of private benefit consumption by comparing
block trade pricing and market pricing (Barclay & Holderness, 1989) or comparing
market prices of different share classes (Zingales, 1995). Other research has measured
secondary agency problems through ownership proxies (Dahya et al. 2008; Setia-Atmaja
et al., 2009) or through the proportion of independent directors (Su et al., 2008).
Additionally, dividend policy and other organizational slack strategies have been
considered in measuring secondary agency conflicts (Kim et al., 2008; La Porta et al.,
2000). The presence of dual class shares has also been employed to empirically examine
expropriation by majority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Renders & Gaeremynck,
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2012). Each of the proxies identifies one aspect of conflict among principals in a firm,
but not the complete domain of secondary agency conflict.
A recent study employed an index that gauges the extent of conflict among
principals (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). Their index contained measures for
percentage of voting shares held by the largest shareholder, a dividend payout ratio,
dummy variables for a second blockholder, whether the voting rights of the largest
shareholder exceeded their cash flow rights by more than 10%, and the presence of dual
class shares. The index included variables that increased the majority shareholders’
ability to extract private benefits. The authors used factor analysis to confirm that all
these related variables loaded on a single factor, which they labeled conflict. Renders and
Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index was a first step towards developing a more
comprehensive measure of secondary agency problems, but their study had some
limitations. First, the conflict among principals was only measured when a blockholder
owned 20% or more of the firm, otherwise the firm was reported to have no conflict.
Since research explains that blockholders with 5% ownership are often influential on firm
decisions (Villalonga & Amit, 2010), many blockholders are excluded in the construction
of the conflict index (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). The sample for the research at hand
includes and measures secondary agency problems in firms with smaller blockholders as
well. Second, Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) aggregated the individual firm conflict at
the country level for validation and testing. Since aggregation at the country level reduces
variation and generalizability (La Porta et al., 2000), the measure developed in this study
is not aggregated and therefore provides greater insights into the conflict at the firm level.
Additionally, the measure proposed by Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) did not contain
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all the identified dimensions of secondary agency conflict and no confirmatory factor
analysis was performed to assess the validity of the unidimensional structure.
The present research improves Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) measure by
including a more comprehensive set of representative variables based on theory and
employing confirmatory factor analysis to ensure validity and reliability of the derived
construct. Studies examining block trade premiums have been limited by sample size
since they are infrequent events (Barclay & Holderness, 1989), while studies examining
dual class share pricing may experience a selection bias since only a fraction of firms
employ these securities (Zingales, 1995). Other measures such as ownership type,
percentage of shares owned, board measures, and free cash flow variables are limiting
since theoretically they only represent a portion of the secondary agency construct.
Therefore, in isolation they may not be sufficient for secondary agency problems to arise.
The measure of inequity among shareholders presented in this chapter represents the
secondary agency conflict within a firm by examining the combination of slack
preferences, ownership and control structures, and board composition of a firm. The
measure will provide a consistent tool for researchers to assess the secondary agency
conflict that exists in many firms.
2.3 CONSTRUCT DEVELOPMENT
Shareholder Inequity is a formative measure that combines four underlying
reflective constructs.5 Each of the underlying constructs contains variables that reflect the
nature of the presented theoretical construct and many have been shown to represent
secondary agency conflicts in related literature. The Shareholder Inequity construct
represents the magnitude of inequality among shareholders in a firm. The theoretical
5

A more detailed discussion of formative and reflective measures will be provided in the Methodology
section of this chapter.
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basis for each construct was explained in Chapter 1 and summarized in Tables 2 through
5. The related construct, justifications, directionality, and data source(s) for each of the
measured variables that were proposed are presented in Table 6 and then further
explained.6

6

Please note that some references from Tables 2 through 5 were more theoretical in nature and have been
omitted from Table 6 for brevity and clarity.
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Table 6: Construct Labels, Measures, Impact on Shareholder Inequity, References, and
Data Sources
Impact on
Theoretical
Label Measures
Shareholder Reference
Data Source
Construct
Inequity7
Total dividend
Yoshikawa
Organizationa
OS1
payments/net
& Rasheed
Compustat
l Slack
profit
(2010)
R&D
Kim et al.
OS2
Compustat
invest/sales
(2008)
Quick
Kim et al.
OS3
+
Compustat
assets/liabilities
(2008)
# of Blocks: 0
Maury &
Blockholder
CapIQ &
BP1
or 3+, then 0; 1 +
Pajuste
Power
Proxies
or 2, then 1
(2005)
Renders &
% owned by
CapIQ
BP2
+
Gaeremynck
largest SH
&Proxies
(2012)
% of shares held
Cronqvist &
by outsiders that
GMI
BP3
+
Fahlenbrach
own 5% or
Ratings
(2009)
greater
Renders &
CapIQ &
Differential
Dual class share
DC1
+
Gaeremynck GMI
Control
indicator
(2012)
Ratings
Voting
Gompers et CapIQ &
DC2 rights/cash
+
al. (2010)
Proxies
rights
TMT and
Deutsch et
GMI
DC3 directors % of
+
al. (2011)
Ratings
shares
Absence of
% of directors
Deutsch et
CapIQ &
Board
BN1
+
affiliated
al. (2011)
Proxies
Neutrality
% of directors
Dahya et al. GMI
BN2
zero shares
(2008)
Ratings
CEO not on
board or BH=0;
CEO on
board=1;
Su et al.
CapIQ/GMI
BN3 CEO on board
+
(2008)Ratings/Pro
and BH=2;
adjusted
xies
CEO chair of
board and
BH=3
7

The measured variables that are negatively related to Shareholder Inequity were reverse coded.
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2.3.1 Organizational Slack Measures
Organizational slack has been defined as the available resources remaining after
all the firm’s commitments are funded (Cyert & March, 1963). The theoretical basis of
the construct was explored in Chapter 1 and summarized in Table 2. Each Organizational
Slack measure summarized in Table 6 reflects an opportunity for some owners to invest
firm resources in a way that does not maximize the wealth of all owners. Differing
preferences for slack resources stem from individual investor goals and risk profiles
(Kochhar & David, 1996). Since publicly listed firms are often comprised of many types
of investors, their preferences will vary and those shareholders controlling the firm
(either directly or through their proxies) choose their preferred policies for the use of
slack resources. Secondary agency research has shown that firms controlled by some
types of blockholders invest more conservatively than firms controlled by other types of
blockholders (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2011; Miller et al., 2010). While the findings
offer evidence of conflict among principals, the proposed Organizational Slack construct
contains indicators that are representative of the heterogeneous preferences of all
shareholders, including minority owners. The indicators, including the ratio of dividend
payouts (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), the intensity of research and development (Kim
et al., 2008) and the level of financial slack (Kim et al., 2008), are explained below and
have been used in secondary agency studies. Therefore, taken together they represent the
proposed Organizational Slack construct.
The dividend payout ratio has been measured in various ways in past research.
Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) used a ratio of dividend per share divided by earnings
per share. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) measured the dividend payout ratio as total ordinary
dividends divided by net income before extraordinary items, while Yoshikawa and
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Rasheed (2010) calculated dividends as total dividend payments divided by net proﬁts.
Faccio et al. (2001) used various indicators with dividends as the numerator and cash,
earnings, sales, and market capitalization as denominators. Each of the above measures
tapped the concept that when wealth has already been distributed to shareholders, the
potential for its misappropriation and disproportionate allocation among shareholders is
reduced. Therefore, it reduces the severity of secondary agency problems. All of the
dividend payout ratios are highly correlated and for this study the dividend payout ratio
was measured as total dividend payments divided by net profits since it is the one most
commonly used in similar research (La Porta et al., 2000; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010).
Dividend payout ratios were proposed to exhibit a negative relationship with Shareholder
Inequity since dividends remove corporate wealth from the discretionary use of
controlling shareholders (Faccio et al., 2011).
Investment in R&D is an important component of firm strategy and requires
significant financial commitment. Kochhar and David (1996) showed that different
owners have different preferences for the frequency and scope of R&D. Research and
development is risky since outcomes are unknown and therefore risk-averse shareholders
may prefer lower amounts allocated to R&D. However, R&D is critical for firm growth
and survival (Kim et al., 2008). From an agency perspective, greater R&D intensity
leaves less residual cash that can potentially be misappropriated. Since many firms have
owners that influence or control the intensity of R&D (e.g., Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach,
2009; Kim et al., 2008), the measure is appropriate for inclusion in a secondary agency
context as well. Following prior research, R&D intensity was measured as R&D expense
as a percentage of sales (Kim et al., 2008; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). Since investment in
R&D leaves less discretionary cash available for misappropriation by owners in control
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of firm operations (Gugler, 2003), this measured variable was proposed to have a
negative relationship with Shareholder Inequity.
High and low levels of financial slack can represent different concerns for
shareholders as well. For instance, some research found that financial slack leads to
suboptimal performance (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), a negative effect, whereas other
research has indicated that financial slack is important for firm growth and flexibility
(Daniel et al., 2004), a positive effect. Given the equivocal effects of financial slack on
firm outcomes (noted in prior studies), the preference for financial slack would also vary
based on shareholder preferences. Moreover, there exists clear evidence that “principalprincipal goal incongruence is aggravated in the increasing presence of financial slack”
(Kim et al., 2008, p. 414). In accordance with related research, financial slack was
measured as the ratio of quick assets to liabilities (Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008). Firms
with financial slack provide controlling shareholders with more opportunities to
expropriate wealth and therefore financial slack was proposed to have a positive
relationship with Shareholder Inequity.
In summary, the Organizational Slack construct proposed included the dividend
payout ratio, the research and development intensity ratio, and the financial slack ratio.
The first two indicators were expected to have a negative relationship with the
Organizational Slack construct and were reverse coded for testing. The overall
relationship between Organizational Slack and Shareholder Inequity was proposed to be
positive.
2.3.2 Blockholder Power Measures
Table 3 in the prior chapter explained the theoretical basis behind the Blockholder
Power construct and Table 6 above summarized the proposed measures. Owning large
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blocks of stock provides shareholders with additional power to influence strategy.
Evidence that private benefits exist from holding ownership blocks was presented in
Chapter 1. Since private benefits of control have been shown to be substantial (Barclay &
Holderness, 1989), firms with no blockholders (a rare occurrence) are assumed to offer
small or nonexistent private benefits. Corporate Library categorizes firms with no
blockholders as “indexed,” defined as “a company where no shareholder owns more than
1-1.5% of the outstanding shares.” The “indexed” categorization reflects a lower amount
of conflict (i.e., reduced Shareholder Inequity). Additionally, a positive relationship with
firm value in the presence of a third strong blockholder was confirmed (Maury & Pajuste,
2005). That particular structure is representative of a more balanced power structure and
makes collusion to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders less likely. Therefore,
the existence of three or more large blockholders was posited to be negatively related to
the inequity among shareholders as well.
Alternatively, block ownership represents expropriation possibilities when one
entity holds greater than five percent (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009; Villalonga &
Amit, 2006).8 A single large shareholder has control and influence in firm strategy
(Faccio & Lang, 2002). When a second large shareholder chooses to invest in the firm,
their motivation may stem from the benefits associated with monitoring the first
blockholder (Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003) or by benefits obtained through colluding with
the first blockholder to expropriate wealth from other shareholders (Maury & Pajuste,
2002). Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) provide weak evidence that a second large
shareholder will collude with the largest shareholder, therefore increasing the conflict
among all shareholders. Additionally, Maury and Pajuste (2005) show collusion to be
8

The 5% threshold is the most commonly used to define blockholding in U.S. studies.
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more likely than monitoring when there are only two blockholders in a firm. Therefore,
when a firm has one or two blockholders, the expropriation concern outweighs the
blockholder monitoring benefits explained in primary agency studies. Therefore, a firm
ownership structure with no blockholders or one with three or more blockholders may be
less likely to experience inequity among shareholders. The measure of the number of
blockholders in a firm was dummy coded as 0 if there existed no blockholders or when
there were three or more blockholders and as 1 if there were one or two blockholders in
the firm. Since some blockholder structures promote monitoring while others promote
colluding (Maury & Pajuste, 2005), the positive indicator was posited to represent the
existence of greater Shareholder Inequity.
The largest shareholder in a firm can exert control over the firm’s operations and
strategy (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2009). The percentage ownership
held by the largest shareholder has been employed as part of a conflict index to assess the
extent of conflict among principals (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012) and used as a proxy
for gauging agency problems in family firms (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). When
ownership concentration is high, so are principal-principal expropriation concerns
(Young et al., 2008). Therefore the second indicator of inequity among shareholders is
the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder. A large ownership position
provides greater private benefits and therefore less equitability for all shareholders. Since
greater ownership positions represent more conflict (Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012), the
proposed relationship between Shareholder Inequity and the percentage of shares owned
by the largest shareholder was positive.
The vast majority of large, publicly traded firms have attracted more than one
outside blockholder (Edmans & Manso, 2011). Outside blockholders are those that do not
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have direct control over firm operations through employment in the firm, but still have
additional power relative to minority shareholders through other means (Cronqvist &
Fahlenbrach, 2009; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2009). The various blockholders have preferences
that may not be in the best interest of all shareholders (Anabtawi, 2005). Outside
blockholders often have board representation that extends their relative power and
thereby maintain a greater ability to influence management (Ravasi & Zattoni, 2009).
These blockholders are more likely to pursue shareholder activism as well. Therefore a
summation of all outside blockholders (i.e., all those with greater than 5% of a firm’s
outstanding shares) holdings as a percentage of total shares outstanding reflects
additional Blockholder Power. The aggregate percentage of the various blockholdings
was proposed to be positively related to the amount of Shareholder Inequity.
Each underlying indicator for the Blockholder Power construct, the number of
blockholders, the percentage owned by the largest shareholder, and the total
blockholdings, was believed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, it
follows that the Blockholder Power construct would be positively related to Shareholder
Inequity as well.
2.3.3 Differential Control Measures
Table 4 in the prior chapter explained the theoretical basis behind the Differential
Control construct and Table 6 above summarized the proposed measures. The
Differential Control construct includes variables that represent the “most extreme”
situations of governance concern (Gompers et al., 2010). Differential voting, through the
use of dual class shares, has long been established in the private benefits of control and
secondary agency literatures (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; La Porta et al., 2000). A
divergence between cash-flow rights and control rights exists in many firms and
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therefore, the largest shareholder is often able to control a firm’s operations with a
relatively small direct stake in its cash-flow rights (Claessens et al., 2002). The situation
has also been referred to as controlling minority shareholders. Therefore, the existence of
dual class shares in a firm is indicative of greater inequity among shareholders. This
study included a dual class share indicator, coded as 1 if the company has issued multiple
classes of shares and 0 otherwise.
The wedge between voting and control rights that often exists in a dual class share
is often cited as a significant source of shareholder conflict (e.g., Gompers et al., 2010;
Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012). The wedge was collected from the proxy statements of
companies that have dual class shares. Specifically, the wedge was measured as the
proportional ratio between voting rights and cash rights associated with the special share
class for each firm (Fan & Wong, 2002). According to prior research that analyzed the
structure of all publically traded dual class companies in the United States, the most
frequent proportion between share classes is 10:1, but it can range even higher in some
firms (Gompers et al., 2010). Those firms with a single class share were assigned a value
of 1 (on this variable) while higher values indicated increased disproportionate control
that was proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity.
Disproportionate control of a firm and the resulting inequity among shareholders
may also stem from share ownership by top managers and directors (Singla et al., 2014).
Use of stock options and grants to align management and shareholder interests (in order
to reduce primary agency problems) has created new principals who now can obtain
disproportionate benefits from their shares (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). In the research
presented here, top managers (and directors) who control the firm are not merely agents.
Instead, due to their ownership stakes, they are principals who may have conflicting
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preferences from other shareholders combined with the ability to extract private benefits
of control. Therefore, the percentage of outstanding shares held by top managers and
directors was proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity.
The existence of dual class shares, the voting ratio between share classes, and the
percentage of shares held by top managers and directors were all predicted to have a
positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, the Differential Control
construct was also predicted to have a positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity.
2.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality Measures
The Absence of Board Neutrality construct was explained in the previous chapter
and summarized in Table 5. Proposed measures for the construct were presented in Table
6 above. Independent and unaffiliated directors represent an important line of defense for
minority shareholders and they should be present to offset owner control (Anderson &
Reeb, 2004; Dahya et al., 2008). Many primary agency studies categorize board members
according to the definition in Corporate Library, where board members are labeled as
inside (employees), outside (fully independent) or outside-related (on-going relationship
with management). Unfortunately the categorization does not identify directors that are
owners or those that represent owner groups. Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) show
that block owners have a greater influence on strategy when they are officers or board
members of a firm as well. Agrawal and Nasser (2011) argue that 1% of a large
company’s outstanding equity is a substantial block when combined with power from
board membership. Therefore, the following section concerning board neutrality defines
block ownership at the 1% or greater level for directors and officers of the company.
Additionally, since this study is focused on the conflict among owners, commonly
employed primary agency measures were adjusted.
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Peng (2004) recognized the inadequacy of board independence in secondary
agency studies and adjusted his measure to include government owner-representation on
the board. Additionally, Dahya et al. (2008) considered a director affiliated if that
individual met any of six different conditions, but three of their conditions are less
relevant to the sample included in this research9. To create the affiliated director measure
in the study here, the following three conditions were considered for each current board
member identified as independent in Corporate Library: (1) he/she is a blockholder, (2)
he/she is an employee of a blockholder, or (3) he/she has the same family name as a
blockholder (steps will be taken to confirm the family relationship when the last name is
common). Since board members in the proposed sample may have additional relevant
relationships with blockholders, an additional condition was also included: (4) he/she is
affiliated with a blockholder. Company affiliation is defined on Capital IQ as, “all the
companies a person is/was associated with (as board, executive and committee).” Board
members were therefore only considered truly unaffiliated (and independent) when none
of the four above conditions existed, and all other directors were labeled and coded as
affiliated. The data were collected from Capital IQ and proxy statements. Higher
percentages of affiliated directors were proposed to reflect an Absence of Board
Neutrality and therefore more Shareholder Inequity.
The board of directors in a corporation is required to monitor and protect the
interests of all shareholders from managerial expropriation. Board members who own no
shares of the corporation on whose boards they serve are rare (Ferris & Yan, 2007). In

9

The excluded measures are: he/she is a director or employee in any company or subsidiary of any
company that is positioned above the sample firm in the ownership tree, he/she is of the same nationality as
the dominant shareholder when the dominant shareholder is a foreigner, and he/she is a politician or
employee of a government agency when the dominant shareholder is a government. In other samples these
conditions may be much more relevant to the independence of directors.
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fact, some companies have policies requiring certain levels of share ownership while
serving as a board member, in order to alleviate primary agency concerns (Bhagat &
Bolton, 2013). Even when not required, directors do not often self-select zero ownership
since the private benefits of ownership combined with directorships may be substantial
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989). Theoretically, directors who own shares are in a position
of disproportionate control per share of ownership, which represents secondary agency
conflict. Therefore, the number of zero-share directors on a firm’s board was proposed to
reflect that the Board is more neutral and therefore negatively related to the inequity
among shareholders.
CEO duality is often measured and studied in primary agency research (Krause,
Semadeni, & Cannella, 2014). Similar to the board independence measure, the variable
must be adjusted to reflect secondary agency problems by including an ownership
component. Therefore, when the CEO serves as the Chair on the board of directors
(duality) and is a blockholder, conflict among shareholders could be exacerbated. In their
study of secondary agency conflict in Chinese corporations, Su et al. (2008) measured
duality with an ordinal variable coded as 3 if the CEO was also chairperson of the board,
2 if the CEO took on a director’s position other than the chair, and 1 if the CEO was
entirely separated from board positions. But the authors did not include ownership
measures. Therefore, the variable in this study was coded as 0 if the CEO is not on the
board, 1 if the CEO is on the board; 2 if the CEO is on the board and a blockholder; 3 if
the CEO is chair of the board and a blockholder. Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, and Bierman
(2010) showed that firms with the top executive in a dual role had boards that were less
attentive in monitoring. The reduced attention to monitoring combined with the
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disproportionate control by an inside owner creates a less neutral board and was proposed
to have a positive relationship with Shareholder Inequity.
The affiliated director measure and the adjusted duality measure were both
proposed to be positively related to Shareholder Inequity while the zero-share measure is
proposed to be negatively related. The zero-share measure was reverse coded for testing.
Therefore, the overall relationship between the Absence of Board Neutrality and
Shareholder Inequity was proposed to be positive.
2.4 METHODOLOGY
2.4.1 Sample and Data Collection
The sample population consisted of firms from the S&P 1500 in 2013. The S&P
1500 includes large cap, mid cap, and small cap firms that are publicly traded in the
United States. The population was selected because only a limited number of studies have
explored secondary agency problems within the United States as these firms are often
assumed to have diffused ownership (Young et al., 2008). However, Holderness (2009)
found that the ownership of U.S. firms appeared no more diffuse than those in other
countries. In his sample of U.S. firms, 96% have blockholders with 5% ownership or
more and blockholders in total owned an average of 39% of the equity. Additionally, the
S&P 1500 index was chosen since it includes various market caps of publicly traded
firms, as opposed to the more common approach of studying only the largest firms, and
therefore the findings will have greater generalizability (Alessandri & Seth, 2014). All
S&P 1500 firms were included in the sample except the Utility (SIC headers 48 and 49)
and Financial (SIC header 6) sectors since they are highly regulated and therefore
typically excluded from analyses such as this one (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011;
Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2014).
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In order to achieve statistical power in the factor analysis, Hair, Black, Babin,
and Anderson (2010) suggest that at least 5 observations per variable should be collected
and this research exceeds the threshold. For additional confirmation of sample size
requirements, an a priori power analysis using G*Power10 was conducted and a minimum
sample size of 76 firms was identified (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). The
projected sample size of approximately 1000 firms (after the above sectors and firms with
missing data were excluded) was identified as large enough to ensure that the findings
from the factor analysis of the proposed constructs and structure would achieve
significant statistical power.
To begin the data collection process, company level firm financial data were
collected from Compustat. The information was merged with board member and
governance data obtained from GMI Ratings. Then, the remaining ownership and board
member data from Capital IQ were also added. Excluding the Utility and Financial
sectors of the S&P 1500 resulted in an initial sample of 1100 firms. Data for the potential
sample were checked before and after merging and firms with missing, conflicting, or
incorrect data were removed. The final sample achieved for the statistical testing included
748 firms. Although lower than the originally projected sample size, the sample was still
much larger than the minimum requirements for the statistical testing to achieve the
necessary power in the results.
2.4.2 Proposed Model Structure
Throughout the first two chapters, an extensive list of possible measures was
presented to examine the theoretical domains underlying secondary agency problems.
The measures were predicted to represent the different facets of secondary agency
10

A power analysis identifies the sample size necessary to identify significant relationships that exist (Hair,
Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2013).
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problems. The facets, or underlying constructs, are the formative indicators that comprise
the proposed Shareholder Inequity index. The index representing secondary agency
problems was proposed to load as a reflective-formative second order hierarchical
construct that combines the reflective first order constructs under a more general second
order concept. Measurement theory explains that reflective constructs represent the
related indicators and their co-variations while formative constructs are explained by
their related indicators (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Additionally, the indicators
for a reflective construct are a representative sample of possible items while the
indicators for a formative construct are a more complete measure of a construct’s domain
(Hair et al., 2010).
The proposed reflective first order constructs were Organizational Slack,
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. The
dimensions were modeled as first order constructs to represent the conceptual level of
abstraction while Shareholder Inequity is formed by the existence of all these dimensions
and is therefore a formative higher order construct. As predicted by theory, the model
performed well statistically with the structure shown below. The conceptual model of the
relationships (as proposed) is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Proposed Shareholder Inequity Model

2.4.3 PLS-SEM and Preliminary Tests
In strategic management, researchers primarily rely on “first-generation”
techniques such as regression analysis and ANOVA. Ketchen, Boyd, and Bergh (2008)
encourages the use of “second-generation” techniques like structural equation modeling
(SEM) to create more appropriate and theoretically-based construct measures instead of
proxies. In line with the encouragement, CB-SEM and PLS-SEM are increasingly used in
the strategic management field (Hair, Sarstedt, Pieper, & Ringle, 2012; Podsakoff, Shen,
& Podsakoff, 2006). Partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was
chosen as the technique for this research since it is appropriate for theory development
(Hair, 2012) and is the preferred SEM approach for secondary data analysis (Sarstedt,
Ringle, Smith, Reams, & Hair, 2014).
Factor analysis enables researchers to incorporate unobservable variables in their
models, like the proposed Shareholder Inequity construct, that are measured indirectly
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while accounting for measurement error in observed variables (Hair et al., 2014). PLSSEM incorporates confirmatory factor analysis in the evaluation of the outer model, or
measurement model. Additionally, PLS-SEM is appropriate since reflective and
formative constructs are both incorporated in the model of Shareholder Inequity and the
endogenous construct had no measures (Sarstedt et al., 2014). Since a validated measure
that represented all facets of secondary agency did not exist, the repeated indicators
approach with mode B was employed (Becker et al., 2012). To employ the repeated
indicator approach, each measured indicator from the lower order constructs were
assigned to the higher order construct to establish the measurement model. Mode B
represents that the repeated indicator model was tested as formative. The PLS algorithm
was run using the path weighting scheme (Hair et al., 2014).
PLS-SEM involves a series of OLS regressions that calculate latent variable
scores from exact linear combinations of the measured variables (Hair, Ringle, &
Sarstedt, 2011). With reflective constructs, like the first order relationships, the outer
loadings represent the relationship from the construct (independent) to the measured
variable (dependent). The process is repeated for each measure to the associated construct
(Hair et al., 2014). The paths between the first order constructs (independent) and the
second order construct (dependent) represent the standardized coefficients in a regression
equation. In many models the regressions produce an R2 value, but since this research
involves a second order model, the paths represent the relative contributions of each
underlying dimension associated with secondary agency problems11 (Becker et al., 2012).
While the relationships between the first order and second order constructs
performed well, there were a few indicator variables that were not fully representative of
11

Tables with the referenced relationships and values will be presented once all measures included in the
final model are explained.

51
the first order constructs. When the measurement model was tested, R&D Intensity (OS2)
loaded poorly. The measure had been reverse coded to represent the negative relationship
with Organizational Slack, but was still negatively correlated after the reverse coding.
Past research shows the importance of considering industry when evaluating R&D
intensity, but adapting the measure to control for industry still did not improve the
relationships to an acceptable level (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1989). Therefore the
measure was removed from the final model. Similarly, the Absence of Board Neutrality
construct’s zero-share director measure (BN2) was negatively coded with inconsistent
patterns in the construct’s loadings and was removed as well. The dummy variable that
incorporated the number of blockholders (BP1) also loaded negatively and was
eliminated since the relationships were unclear.12 The theoretical basis for the BP1
measure was established in the European context and therefore the blockholding
relationships may be different in U.S. firms (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Maury & Pajuste,
2005). Once the three measures were eliminated, the indicator loadings were directionally
correct, but two additional indicators, BP3 and DC2, were subsequently eliminated
during the various statistical tests, as explained in later sections.
2.4.4 Final Model and Results
For reflective constructs in a second order model, the internal consistency,
indicator reliability, and convergent validity should be evaluated (Hair et al., 2011). To
test the formative constructs in the second order model, convergent validity, collinearity,
and relative contributions of the constructs were evaluated (Diamantopoulos, 2011). For
the structural model as a whole, the predictive relevance and path coefficient significance
were evaluated (Hair et al., 2011). The results concerning the reflective constructs
12

The BP1 variable was actually replaced by a similar measure explained in a later section.
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(dimensions) will be explained first, followed by the formative relationships, and then the
overall model.
Traditionally, Cronbach’s alpha is used to evaluate construct reliability, but in
PLS the evaluation of the composite reliability score is more appropriate (Hair et al.,
2014). The estimation of Cronbach’s alpha is based on the equal weighting of each
indicator while the composite reliability score uses the indicator’s actual outer loadings in
the equation. Acceptable levels of composite reliability range from .6-.9. All constructs
exhibited acceptable construct reliability scores as shown in Table 7. The Organizational
Slack construct had the lowest score at .724. Blockholder Power had a .819 composite
reliability score while the Differential Control and Absence of Board Neutrality
constructs had the highest scores, .834, as shown in Table 7.
Convergent validity is achieved when the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of
the construct is .5 or higher (Hair et al., 2014). The AVE describes the constructs’
extracted variance and communality between a construct’s indicators (Hair et al., 2014).
All constructs met this requirement as well. Similar to the composite reliability scores,
Organizational Slack was the lowest (.572), then Blockholder Power (.694), followed by
the Differential Control (.718) and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs (.718). Table
7 shows each abbreviation that represents the constructs in the remaining tables, the
AVE, and the composite reliability scores for each construct representing a specific
dimension of secondary agency problems.
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Table 7: Construct Abbreviation, AVE, and Composite Reliability
Construct
Construct
AVE
Abbreviation
Organizational
OrgSlack
.572
Slack
Blockholder
BlockPower
.694
Power
Differential
DiffControl
.718
Control
Absence of
AbsenceNeutralBOD
.718
Board Neutrality

Composite
Reliability
.724
.819
.834
.834

While construct and convergent reliability levels were acceptable, two indicators
exhibited loadings that were lower than the recommended .7 level (Hair et al., 2014). The
Blockholder Power measure of outside blockholdings (BP3) was the lowest at .423. The
lower loading could be explained by findings in Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) that
showed that certain blockholders were significantly more influential when their
ownership was combined with management involvement (Differential Control) or board
representation (Absence of Board Neutrality). Since the Blockholder Power’s indicator
BP3 only examined outside blockholders, their influence on firm policy may be limited.
The level was just above the minimum .4 loading that is acceptable in exploratory
studies. Measures between .4-.7 should be eliminated if the removal improves the AVE
(Hair et al., 2014). Since the BP3 measure’s removal improved the AVE, it was
eliminated from the model.
With the removal of BP3, Blockholder Power was reduced to a single indicator
construct. Since single item constructs are to be avoided in PLS when possible
(Diamantopoulos, Sarstedt, Fuchs, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2012), other potential
indicators were considered that would represent the construct more appropriately. As
explained in the last section, the original dummy variable that measured the power
associated with different numbers of blockholders (BP1) was eliminated from the model
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for negative loadings and uninterpretable results. The interactions among the various
blockholders has been shown as a component of secondary agency conflict (Gugler &
Yurtoglu, 2003; Maury & Pajuste, 2005; Sacristán-Navarro, Gómez-Ansón, & CabezaGarcía, 2011); so a different measure to capture that interaction was important to include
in the Shareholder Inequity model. Renders and Gaeremynck (2012) originally included a
variable in their index that represented the difference between the ownership blocks of
the largest and second largest shareholders. The measure was dummy coded as 1 if the
difference was greater than 10% and 0 otherwise, but it was excluded from their final
index since it exhibited a weak positive influence on the conflict index (Renders &
Gaeremynck, 2012). Therefore, it was not originally considered for inclusion in the
Shareholder Inequity model either. Since Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) study was
conducted in a different context and excluded components of secondary agency
problems, the measure was re-evaluated for inclusion in the Shareholder Inequity model
as it seemed appropriate to capture the interactions that influenced the power of some
blockholders. The measure was duplicated with the current sample data and introduced as
BlockDiff in the Blockholder Power construct. The BlockDiff indicator was more
representative of the Blockholder Power construct and included in the final Shareholder
Inequity model.
The second indicator that did not load as expected was the Organizational Slack
measure of financial slack (OS3) at .612. While the number was still below the preferred
threshold for retention in the model (.7), indicators that are theoretically appropriate
should not be removed from the model unless there is a significant improvement in the
AVE (Hair et al., 2014). Since financial slack is an important theoretical component of
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secondary agency problems (Kim et al., 2008) and since the removal of OS3 did not
improve the AVE, it was retained in the model.
Covariance based SEM (CB-SEM) requires a minimum of three measures per
construct, but two-item constructs are appropriate in PLS-SEM since the method does not
have the same imposed identification constraints (Diamantopoulos et al., 2012). The only
restriction on the repeated indicators method employed for model testing with PLS-SEM
is that each of the constructs in the model should have the same number of measured
variables (Becker et. al., 2012). Since the Differential Control construct had three
indicators while each of the other constructs had two, the three measures (DC1, DC2, and
DC3) were evaluated for removal. The dual class dummy variable (DC1) and the dual
class wedge variable (DC2) were the most highly correlated while the insider ownership
variable (DC3) seemed to represent a different aspect of the Differential Control
dimension of secondary agency conflict. Since the DC1 dummy variable and the DC3
percentage were included in the Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index and the
DC2 variable was measured differently in their study, DC1 and DC3 were retained while
DC2 was excluded from the final model.
The final tested PLS-SEM model is shown below in Figure 2. All indicator
loadings are shown on the path between the individual indicator and their related
construct in Figure 2 and again in Table 8, which also shows the indicator cross-loadings.
All loadings meet acceptable levels and, with the exception of the financial slack measure
(that was retained as explained previously), exceed the recommended .7 level (Hair et al.,
2014).
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Figure 2: Final Shareholder Inequity Model

The next test of the model was the examination of the discriminant validity. When
models achieve discriminant validity, it establishes that the constructs were truly distinct
from one another (Hair et al., 2014). The first test of discriminant validity involved the
evaluation of each indicator’s crossloadings with the various constructs in the model.
Measured variables should be more correlated to their assigned construct than to any
other constructs in the model (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009). Table 8 offers
evidence of discriminant validity as no significant cross-loadings were identified. Table 8
also includes the measure labels as proposed and the final measure labels that were
changed so that they would be more descriptive.
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Table 8: Indicator Loadings
Old
Label

New
Label

Org
Slack

Block
Power

Diff
Control

OS1

DivPay

.849

.057

.045

Absence
Neutral
BOD
.074

OS3

FincSlack

.650

.047

-.026

.047

BP2

LargestBlock

.085

.863

.367

.095

N/A

BlockDiff

.026

.803

.255

.109

DC1

DualClass

-.035

.136

.751

.110

DC3

InsideOwn

.048

.433

.934

.372

BN1

AffilDirector

.107

.167

.397

.946

BN3

ModDuality

-.002

-.022

.044

.735

As an additional test of discriminant validity, the Fornell-Larker criteria were
assessed (Fornell & Larker, 1981). In the test, each construct’s squared AVE must be
higher than the correlation with the other constructs. The Fornell-Larker test offered
further evidence of discriminant validity in the Shareholder Inequity model, as shown in
Table 9.
Table 9: Fornell-Larker Criterion
Square Root:
Construct
AVE
OrgSlack
.756

OrgSlack

BlockPower

DiffControl

1

BlockPower

.833

.069

1

DiffControl

.848

.021

.378

1

AbsenceNeutralBOD .847

.082

.121

.321

Recent findings suggest that evaluation of crossloadings and the Fornell-Larker
criteria may not represent discriminant validity correctly and recommend the Heterotraitmonotrait ratio (HTMT) test (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). To obtain the HTMT
ratio, the correlations of the indicators across constructs and the correlations of indicators
within the same construct were compared (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). The
comparison of the correlations led to values below the .9 recommendation (Henseler,
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Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Therefore, it was confirmed that the constructs exhibit
discriminant validity as shown in Table 10.
Table 10: Heterotrait-monotrait Ratio
Construct
OrgSlack

BlockPower

DiffControl

OrgSlack
BlockPower

.173

DiffControl

.010

.549

AbsenceNeutralBOD

.145

.143

.346

The next area of testing is the formative portion of the model that evaluates the
relationships among the dimensions and their contributions to Shareholder Inequity. To
validate the formative portion of the model, convergent validity, multicollinearity, and
statistical significance of the paths were evaluated (Hair et al., 2014). To assess the
convergent validity of a formative model, a redundancy analysis was performed (Chin,
1998). A redundancy analysis uses a formatively measured construct (Shareholder
Inequity) as the independent variable that predicts another construct that measures the
same phenomenon and is measured reflectively or as a single item. The magnitude of the
path between the two constructs should be at least .8 (Hair et al., 2014). Since Renders
and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index seemed the closest possible match, data for their
index were collected and compared to the new model of secondary agency conflict. The
strength of the path coefficient between Shareholder Inequity and the conflict index was
.8130.
The absence of significant collinearity was tested through the evaluation of
Tolerance and VIF levels. It is especially important to test for multicollinearity in
formative models since the constructs should measure different theoretical components
that combine to create the endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2011). The extent of
multicollinearity was assessed by regressing each dimension individually against the
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other three. According to Hair et al. (2014), in PLS-SEM the tolerance (TOL) levels
should be above .2 and the variance inflation factor (VIF) levels should fall below 5.
Table 11 shows that each construct’s values were well below the critical levels of
multicollinearity with the lowest TOL being only .779 and the highest VIF being only
1.283.
Table 11: Multicollinearity Assessment
Construct

TOL

VIF

OrgSlack=BlockPower+DiffControl+AbsenceNeutralBOD .989

1.011

BlockPower=OrgSlack+DiffControl+AbsenceNeutralBOD .854

1.172

DiffControl=BlockPower+OrgSlack+AbsenceNeutralBOD .779
AbsenceNeutralBOD
.891
=BlockPower+DiffControl+OrgSlack

1.283
1.122

The final evaluation of a formative model is the assessment of the relative
importance of the various paths leading to the endogenous construct (Hair et al., 2014). In
the Shareholder Inequity model, all paths (and therefore dimensions), contribute at
similar levels. Therefore, all four dimensions are important and similarly related to
secondary agency conflict and should be included in the structural model. The Absence
of Board Neutrality construct is the largest contributor (.430), followed by Differential
Control (.415) and Blockholder Power (.404), and then the Organizational Slack
construct (.376). The path values are also shown in Table 12 that illustrates the
significance of the relationships.
To evaluate the structural model as a whole, bootstrapping and blindfolding
procedures were administered in SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005). Bootstrapping evaluates
the significance of the relationships by calculating the t-values from the standard errors
(Sarstedt et al., 2014). The bootstrapping procedure analyzes the path coefficients
between each measured variable and their first order constructs and between the
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measured variables and their assigned first order constructs (Hair et al., 2014). The path
values, T-statistics, and significance levels are shown in Table 12. All relationships in the
final model were significant at the <.0001 level.
Table 12: Significance Testing
Construct Paths

Path/Loading

T-Statistics

Significance

OrgSlack->ShareInequity

.376

40.801

<.0001

BlockPower_> ShareInequity

.404

38.134

<.0001

DiffControl-> ShareInequity
AbsenceNeutralBOD->
ShareInequity
DivPay<-OrgSlack

.415

42.995

<.0001

.430

44.984

<.0001

.849

10.351

<.0001

FinSlack<-OrgSlack

.649

4.33

<.0001

LargestBlock<-BlockPower

.863

42.972

<.0001

BlockDiff<-BlockPower

.803

27.834

<.0001

Dual Class<-DiffControl

.751

10.619

<.0001

InsideOwn<-DiffControl

.934

114.420

<.0001

AffilDirector<-AbsenceNeutralBOD

.946

91.094

<.0001

ModDuality<-AbsenceNeutralBOD

.735

16.600

<.0001

Since PLS-SEM has no appropriate goodness-of-fit measure, the overall
predictive ability is determined by the Q2 value (Rigdon, 2014). To obtain the Q2 value,
the blindfolding procedure on SmartPLS was employed. Blindfolding establishes an
omission distance and then removes the indicators one at a time and measures the
parameters with the data points that remain (Chin, 1998; Henseler et al., 2009). When
evaluating predictive relevance, values greater than .02, .15, and .35 indicate that an
exogenous construct has a small, medium, or large predictive relevance for an
endogenous construct. The Shareholder Inequity construct in the model had an average
Q2 value of .27, indicating that it exhibited predictive relevance.
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2.5 SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
2.5.1 Summary
In this chapter each variable that has been employed previously in the evaluation
of secondary agency conflicts was reviewed and defined. The variables were linked to the
dimensions of the conflict among the firm’s principals: Organizational Slack,
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. The
relationships between the various proposed constructs and secondary agency conflicts,
and therefore the Shareholder Inequity within a firm, were also analyzed. Following
Venkatraman (1989), the proposed Shareholder Inequity measure was created
methodically by exploring the different dimensions of the construct based on the
theoretical underpinnings, in order to reduce measurement error.
2.5.2 Contributions
The lack of consistent definitions and measurement tools for secondary agency
conflict represented a gap in the governance literature. Clear definitions and boundaries
for the dimensions of secondary agency conflict have now been established for future
studies that employ these constructs (Suddaby, 2010). As explained in extant literature, a
consistent definition that explains the various dimensions is necessary to legitimize
phenomena and constructs (Short, Payne, & Ketchen, 2008). Defining dimensions leads
to a greater understanding of the antecedents and consequences that is required for theory
building (Eisenhardt, 1989). Consequently the valid and generalizable index produced in
this study is an important step in the understanding of the conflict among shareholders in
a firm. While the Shareholder Inequity measure is an important contribution to scholarly
research involving secondary agency conflict, it may also represent an additional tool for
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investors to incorporate in their decision making when evaluating potential and current
investments.
Each theoretical dimension of Shareholder Inequity was tested and analyzed using
the PLS-SEM methodology. While a few of the proposed measured variables had to be
removed or adjusted, the proposed dimensions and overall structure of the model were
confirmed. The statistical validation of the proposed model conforms to the theoretical
predictions of prior secondary agency research. The Organizational Slack, Blockholder
Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs exhibited
internal consistency, indicator reliability, convergent validity, and statistical significance.
Secondary agency conflict is shown to comprise of four separate underlying dimensions
that do not exhibit high levels multicollinearity, but instead are correlated and explain one
factor, Shareholder Inequity. Therefore, it can be concluded that the proposed model is a
valid measure of secondary agency problems in firms. This measure of secondary agency
conflict can and should be employed in future research so that governance problems are
more easily identified and suitable remedies explored.
To further establish model stability and generalizability (Hair et al., 2010), the
measure of Shareholder Inequity and the underlying dimensions were subsequently tested
by examining the market reaction to acquisition announcements. The results are
presented in Chapter 3. The extent of inequity exhibited by each acquiring firm was
analyzed to understand the market reaction to the announced strategic choices of firms
with various levels of secondary agency conflict. Multiple control variables, including
those that represented primary agency conflict, were included in the regression models so
that the effects related to the firm’s slack resources, ownership power and control, and
board neutrality could be isolated and analyzed.
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2.5.3 Limitations and Future Research
As with any research there are limitations in this study. It is possible that all the
dimensions of secondary agency conflicts have not been identified in research to date, but
every effort has been made to ensure that the variables employed in prior studies were
included in order to avoid model misspecification. Ownership “type” is often included in
studies of conflict among principals (e.g., Sacristán-Navarro et al., 2011; Villalonga &
Amit, 2009), but that was beyond the scope of the research. Additionally, the repeated
indicators approach to structural equation modeling of proposed constructs is a relatively
new method. The repeated indicator approach allows for the exploration of new
constructs and additional testing is encouraged as the methodology is further refined.
Lastly, since ownership trends and structures vary between countries and regions, the
proposed constructs will need to be adjusted when used in other contexts.
The newly developed measure of secondary agency conflict could be applied in
many contexts. Researchers could introduce the type of owner (e.g., family firms,
institutions, activists) as a moderator. This may allow for identification of certain types of
firms that should be scrutinized more carefully for the presence of secondary agency
problems. Future research could examine the constructs in other countries that have
different ownership structures, laws, and political pressures. Studies considering the
potential trade-offs between primary agency and secondary agency should be encouraged
as well.
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CHAPTER 3
3.1 PAPER TWO ABSTRACT
While firm acquisitions have been studied extensively in the context of primary
agency theory, considerably less attention has been given to secondary agency theoretical
concerns. In the preceding two chapters, a new measure representing the extent of
inequity among shareholders was introduced and tested. The Shareholder Inequity model
was found to capture the underlying theoretical dimensions of secondary agency conflict.
This chapter offers further validation by testing the measure in a model with a different
dataset spanning multiple years. Additionally, the incongruence among principals which
stems from disparate preferences for Organizational Slack, varying degrees of
Blockholder Power, Differential Control, the Absence of Board Neutrality, and the
combination of the domains (Shareholder Inequity) was assessed in an acquisition
announcement event study. The regression results offer evidence that several of the
constructs representing the underlying dimensions and the overall measure of secondary
agency problems significantly influence the market’s reaction to announced acquisitions.
In firms with secondary agency problems investors seemed to recognize that some
strategic changes were beneficial in some way (either pecuniary or non-pecuniary) to a
particular shareholder or groups of shareholders, while reducing the future value of the
firm. The presented research also offers evidence that the market’s negative reaction is
greater when firms with secondary agency conflict announce acquisitions that are
diversifying in nature.
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3.2 ACQUISITION LITERATURE REVIEW
Acquisition decisions are one of the most significant corporate resource allocation
decisions that have the potential to influence shareholder wealth (Wan & Yiu, 2009).
Early research claimed that acquisitions produced positive returns, but further
investigation revealed that increased profitability for the target firms accounted for the
majority of those gains, while acquiring firms experienced neutral or negative returns
(Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Therefore, scholars
investigated alternate explanations for the frequency of acquisition activity. Based on a
meta-analytic study, King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) suggested that nonﬁnancial
motives may be under-represented in theory and research that seeks to explain merger
and acquisition (M&A) activities and outcomes.
One common theoretical explanation provided for value reducing acquisitions is
primary agency conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to agency theory, managers may
pursue unprofitable acquisitions for financial and socio-emotional reasons that are not in
the best interest of shareholders (Gomez-Mejia, & Wiseman, 1997; Jensen, 1986). A
current and related line of research examines shareholder value destruction in acquisition
activity by employing the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick’s (2003) anti-takeover index to
represent firms that have the most severe primary agency conflicts (Harford, HumpheryJenner, & Powell, 2012; Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2007). Harford et al. (2012) and Masulis
et al. (2007) both offered evidence of entrenched managers classified as “dictators” who
chose poor targets for acquisition activity leading to significantly lower postannouncement period abnormal stock returns, and therefore the destruction of firm value.
While prior agency research has investigated the conflict between owners and
managers, there is a stream of research that has identified similar conflicts among owners
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in publicly listed firms (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Faccio, Lane & Young;
Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). There are two important considerations
when transitioning from the established primary agency conflicts to secondary agency
conflicts. The first is that primary agency theory has placed the blame for the agency
conflict solely on managers (Masulis et al., 2007), but research has shown that managers
of publicly listed firms do not choose strategy independently. Instead, they are highly
influenced by many sources including, but not limited to, the board of directors,
institutional investors, and founders or their families (Barclay & Holderness, 1989;
Devers, McNamara, Haleblian, & Yoder, 2013; Harford, Jenter, & Li, 2007; Villalonga
& Amit, 2009).
The second point is that the increased use of ownership stakes to align
management and shareholder interests (intended to reduce primary agency problems)
have unforeseen and sometimes undesirable consequences (Alessandri & Seth, 2014).
One such consequence is the creation of a new set of principals that derive
disproportionate control (and benefits) from their share ownership. Both influential
principals and managerial principals are in a position to manipulate the strategic direction
of the firm and may prefer acquisitions that are not value-maximizing for all shareholders
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000). For example, Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Lester (2010)
showed that family firms are more likely to pursue diversifying acquisitions to reduce the
family’s personal portfolio risk. However, as argued by Anderson and Reeb (2003), risk
reduction in the family’s portfolio would not necessarily benefit the non-family
shareholders since the minority shareholders’ wealth (and, by implication, risk) is not
concentrated in one firm. This represents secondary agency conflict and illustrates the
potential for minority shareholder wealth expropriation. In fact, Faccio et al. (2001)
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posited that controlling shareholders may even extract high private returns from projects
yielding negative corporate returns. The private benefits are a consequence of inefficient
strategic choices in firms with high levels of secondary agency conflict (Young et al.,
2008).
Acquisitions are complex events with high information asymmetry and risk
(Boeh, 2011). The value created by the acquisition activity is the present value of all
future cash ﬂows generated by the acquiring and target ﬁrms combined, less the value of
all future cash flows that would have been earned independently (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).
Investors’ perceptions of the announced acquisition activity are frequently measured by
the abnormal stock price changes surrounding the announcement of the activity
(Haleblian et al., 2009). Research has shown that investors consider potential secondary
agency conflicts when making investment decisions and act accordingly as evidenced by
lower cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). CAR represents the market reaction that is
different from the average trends for a particular firm and it is calculated by summating
the abnormal stock returns for each day surrounding a particular event (Brown & Warner,
1980). When shareholders have negative perceptions concerning the announced
acquisition they will sell their shares, therefore reducing the stock price, and creating
higher abnormal stock returns. Chen and Young (2010) employed the event study
methodology to provide evidence that minority shareholders were suspicious of
announced acquisitions when the Chinese government was a blockholder in the firm, as
evidenced by a negative CAR. This study examines and answers a more general
theoretical question. When firms with inherent secondary agency problems announce
acquisitions, will investors perceive additional inequity and react negatively, as
evidenced by short-term abnormal stock returns?
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To answer the research question, the newly derived construct, Shareholder
Inequity (representative of secondary agency conflicts among principals within a firm)
was first disaggregated into the underlying components developed in the prior chapter.
Hypotheses were tested for the investor reactions to acquisition announcements in
relation to the underlying components of secondary agency conflict; Organizational
Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality. An
additional hypothesis addressed the Shareholder Inequity composite as a whole in
relation to acquisition frequency and investor perceptions. Lastly, a final hypothesis
explained the unique effects of secondary agency problems when announcements
involved diversifying acquisitions. Some of the measured variables that reflect
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board
Neutrality have been shown in prior research to negatively impact shareholder wealth at
the time of acquisition announcements. The new composite constructs, from Chapter 2,
provided further insights since they reflected particular theoretical areas of secondary
agency conflict.
Acquisition activity in firms was an appropriate environment for testing the newly
developed constructs for multiple reasons. Schijven and Hitt (2012) explained that
investors consider all available information, including the motivations and perceptions of
other firm actors. Therefore, once primary agency problems and other variables shown to
influence investor reactions were controlled for methodologically, additional insights
were gained from investors' perceptions of the extant conflicts among owners. Paul
(2007) explained that the announcement return is a function not only of perceived bid
quality, but also of information unrelated to that bid which is revealed in the decision to
bid. Additionally, investors may perceive new Shareholder Inequities from the decision
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to acquire, the details of the acquisition, the proposed resulting merged firm or a
combination of the above factors. The perceptions may lead to a reallocation of the
owners’ shareholdings in the acquiring firm and also result in overall changes to the
wealth of all the firm’s shareholders. The reallocation will be captured by the cumulative
abnormal returns surrounding the acquisition announcement providing a clear and
measurable reaction to the perceived inequities. The following section explores these
relationships when a new acquisition is first announced.
3.3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.3.1 Organizational Slack
Acquisitions are risky and require major resource commitments but are generally
discretionary in nature (Wan & Yiu, 2009). Conflicts concerning discretionary resources
are often cited and controlled for in primary agency research (Devers et al., 2013;
Masulis et al., 2007). Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis predicts poor investment
choices when managers have control of slack resources. As explained above, managers
are not the sole decision makers; instead they are influenced by owners with special
interests. The Organizational Slack construct validated in Chapter 2 represents the
likelihood that firms are not employing resources in a way that is beneficial and equitable
to the various owners involved. When all excess slack is returned to shareholders in the
form of dividends, expropriation is not possible (Castaner & Kavadis, 2013).
Additionally, when excess slack is spent on R&D activities, expropriation is less likely
(Gugler, 2003). Alternatively, when excess slack exists in an organization, pursuit of
private benefits by controlling shareholders is more likely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Young et al., 2008).
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Past research identified that cash reserves and subsequent acquisition spending
were positively correlated (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz, & Williamson, 1999). Similarly,
findings report that companies with larger amounts of slack resources are more likely to
engage in value-decreasing acquisitions (Harford, 1999). Organizational slack is related
to more frequent acquisitions and higher premium payments for acquisition targets (Wan
& Yiu, 2009). Investors account for the higher premiums when considering the value of
the acquisition (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).
According to the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970), at any point in time
the market fully reflects all publicly available information in its share pricing. Investors
are aware of the levels and allocation of slack resources prior to the acquisition
announcements, but the announcement provides new information concerning projected
future allocations of slack. The projected future allocations may not be compatible with
investors’ goals, and therefore owners may respond by reducing their holdings in the
firm. Savvy investors are also aware that large amounts of slack encourage the pursuit of
inefficient strategies (Jensen, 1986), and acquisitions are likely to further decrease value
for the acquirer’s shareholders (King et al., 2004). Additionally, past research has
identified that cash-rich firms experience negative stock price reactions (Harford, 1999).
Investors will account for the allocation of slack resources and recognize that the
proposed acquisition is likely to further lower the future value of the firm. These owners
will subsequently reduce their ownership position in reaction to the acquisition
announcement.
Therefore,
H1: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition
announcements by firms with more Organizational Slack in their financial
structure.
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3.3.2 Blockholder Power
Recent findings show that competitive actions taken by executives are
significantly related to a firm’s ownership structure (Connelly, Tihanyi, & Hitt, 2010).
Most publicly listed firms have at least one block owner and a 5% level of block
ownership is considered substantial enough to influence policies and strategies
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The Blockholder Power construct validated in Chapter 2
measures the power large shareholders have relative to minority shareholders. Cronqvist
and Fahlenbrach (2009) explored blockholder heterogeneity and influence. They found
that the differences in investment and governance styles across firms with different
categories of blockholders (e.g., activists, pension funds, individuals, corporations) were
influential enough to affect firm performance outcomes. Therefore, the different
investment styles (including the number of acquisitions and the number of diversifying
acquisitions) may add value for certain types of blockholders without adding value for
the firm.
Additionally, many firms have shareholder groups who have cross-holdings in
both the buyer and target companies. Concentrated shareholders with stakes in only the
bidder want management to focus on the buyer’s resulting equity value, while
shareholders with cross-holdings in both the acquiring and target firms are more focused
on the outcomes for both parties (Harford et al., 2007). Often firm decision-makers are
alert to blockholders’ interests since activist investors may confront and attempt to
replace board members and top management teams (Dai, 2007). An increased frequency
of value-destroying acquisitions has been documented when there is a higher percentage
of outside blockholder ownership (Paul, 2007).
The power of firm blockholders drives more frequent acquisitions and also
influences certain acquisition details. For instance, Wright, Kroll, Lado, and van Ness
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(2002) offered evidence that risk preferences of powerful owners inﬂuence the target
selection process. Target selection is one of many areas that shape shareholders’ opinions
about the value of an announced acquisition. In one example of owner influence, Chen
and Young (2010) showed that investors were more skeptical of acquisition deals when
the government had block ownership. Since information about large ownership positions
is publically available, investors may be aware of and be able to identify the hidden
pursuit of special interests when acquisitions are announced. One example of this
occurring in a different announcement setting was the study by Gugler and Yurtoglu
(2003). They offered evidence that the market reacted more negatively to dividend
reduction announcements when large shareholders influenced strategic decisions.
Blockholders and powerful minority shareholders may pressure managers into
undertaking transactions that produce benefits for them at the expense of the broader
shareholder base (Anabtawi, 2005). Other investors do account for such influence (Chen
& Young, 2010; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003). Investors in firms with Blockholder Power
are more likely to have concerns about their true motivations concerning the pursuit of an
announced acquisition.
Therefore,
H2: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition
announcements by firms with greater blockholder power in their ownership
structure.
3.3.3 Differential Control
Disproportionate control among shareholders may arise from dual class share
structures and from inside ownership. The Differential Control construct that was
validated in Chapter 2 reflects the most direct path to additional control per share owned.
Dual class shares are a significant source of conflict among shareholders (Renders &
Gaeremynck, 2012; Villalonga & Amit, 2009) since shareholders of the disproportionate
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share class have additional power to direct strategy. Additionally, the increased use of
ownership stakes to align management and shareholder interests (to reduce primary
agency problems) has created new principals that obtain disproportionate benefits from
their shares. These owners/managers often have conflicting preferences and the ability to
extract private benefits of control. As explained by Hoi and Robin (2010), owners (who
are also fulfilling a managerial or a board role) are the most able to extract private
benefits since these shareholders are in a position where the incentives to expropriate are
coupled with the opportunity to do so.
Investor reactions to acquisition announcements by firms with Differential
Control have been studied in related research. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009) found dual
class firms with greater separation between ownership and control generated lower
returns for their shareholders when they acquired other firms. However, their study
focused on executive holdings and interpreted expropriation as a primary agency concern.
A dual class share structure is more appropriately studied in the context of secondary
agency problems since this structure represents disproportionate control among owners
(Bebchuk, 1999; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011). Investors’ negative responses to
acquisitions should remain even after controlling for primary agency costs, since
managerial ownership levels may also be contributing to secondary agency problems
resulting in investors’ negative responses (Chen & Young, 2010).
Additionally, minority shareholders are less likely to have prior knowledge of
firm decisions since large shareholders dominate the decision-making processes
involving the company. Minority shareholders are often kept in the dark as to the actual
status of the corporations of which they are part-owners (Young et al., 2008). Since
information asymmetries exist between controlling owners and minority shareholders,
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acquisition announcements may cause minority shareholders to re-evaluate the strategic
alignment and congruence of their goals with those of the organization (and those of the
dominant shareholders). These investors may perceive that firms with Differential
Control are not acting in the best interests of all shareholders.
Therefore,
H3: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition
announcements by firms with greater Differential Control in their governance
structures.
3.3.4 Absence of Board Neutrality
Directors serving on corporate boards are responsible for protecting all
shareholders from expropriation of their wealth (Fama & Jensen, 1983). But agency
research indicates that directors often are the “rubber stamp” for managers (Young et al.,
2008). Close relationships between directors and managers (of firms) have been shown to
compromise the board’s objective and independent monitoring activities and
consequently weaken its effectiveness as a mechanism that even-handedly protects the
interests of all shareholders (Brunninge, Nordqvist, & Wiklund, 2007). The Absence of
Board Neutrality construct validated in Chapter 2 represents how equitably board
members treat all shareholders’ interests when fulfilling their monitoring and advising
roles in a firm.
Building on the primary agency measures of board independence and duality
(Schleifer & Vishny, 1997) combined with secondary agency studies of ownership
proximity (Hoi & Robin, 2010), boards are presumed to be less neutral when powerful
owners and managers dominate firm decisions. Effective board monitoring is integral to
reducing primary agency problems associated with M&A activity (Goranova,
Dharwadkar, & Brandes, 2010). However, research has indicated that particular board
members may represent the interests of some shareholders more than others. For instance,
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Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) provided evidence that firms pursue larger numbers of
acquisitions when blockholders have board representation. Additionally, Dahya,
Dimitrov, and McConnell (2008), who similarly modified the board independence
measure to reflect ownership interests, showed increased related party transactions for
firms with greater percentages of affiliated directors. Since acquisitions often reduce firm
value, the above findings indicate that boards may approve value-destroying strategies
when they are influenced by certain owners. While owners may already be aware of the
composition of the acquirer’s board, the acquisition announcement provides shareholders
with additional information. When the Board is not equally representing all shareholder
interests, just the decision to bid may confirm prior shareholder concerns (Paul, 2007).
Since directors have access to both private ﬁrm-speciﬁc information as well as
disproportionate control over ﬁrm actions (Kosnik, 1990), their perceived neutrality (or
lack thereof) is an important consideration for investors when evaluating the value of an
announced acquisition.
Therefore,
H4: Ceteris paribus, there will be a negative market reaction to acquisition
announcements by firms that exhibit a greater Absence of Board Neutrality in
their governance structure.
3.3.5 Shareholder Inequity
In the previous chapter a composite measure of multiple dimensions underlying
secondary agency problems was motivated, developed, and tested. The combination of
the separate dimensions (Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control,
and Absence of Board Neutrality) represents the Shareholder Inequity construct. Their
separate relationships with investor reactions to acquisition announcement have been
presented in the preceding hypotheses.
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Recent research has shown that many CEOs (and their boards) are not confident
in the value-enhancing characteristics of mergers and acquisitions they have pursued, as
evidenced by management and director stock sales soon after acquisition announcements
are made (Devers et al., 2013). Research encouraged additional examinations of the
motivations behind such moves and suggested several possible influences including the
managerial pursuit of private interests (Kim & Rasheed, 2013). In the context of
secondary agency, an alternate (but related) explanation may exist. Often executives are
in frequent contact with influential shareholders and accordingly take actions more
aligned with the preferences of these powerful owners since they are aware that their job
security is at stake if they do not comply (Connelly et al., 2010). Therefore, the
executives, persuaded by blockholders, may pursue value-destroying strategies that create
benefits for some influential blockholders at the expense of other shareholders.
Executives agree to pursue the strategies at the behest of influential owners, but
concurrently reduce their holdings since they may not be confident about the firm’s
future profitability.
Additionally, research has shown that acquisitions often represent a transfer of
wealth from the acquirer’s shareholders to the target’s shareholders. Institutional owners
often have equity holdings in both acquiring and target firms (Goranova et al., 2010). The
owners with cross-holdings would be indifferent to the destruction of wealth for
acquiring shareholders when that wealth is transferred to the target, since their overall
portfolio is not affected. Similarly, Harford et al. (2007) explained that concentrated
shareholders with stakes in only the bidder want management to focus on the acquirer’s
equity value, while shareholders with cross-holdings are more focused on the success of
the outcomes for both parties. Related research argued that investor cross-holdings may
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explain the low and often negative returns to acquiring firms in takeovers since bidder
shareholders with large cross-holdings do not mind overpaying for targets and therefore
do not block value-destroying takeovers (Matvos & Ostrovsky, 2008). Therefore,
principals who do not gain additional benefits may perceive higher takeover premiums as
an indication of a less rational and equitable acquisition decision and will reduce or
eliminate their ownership position (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).
Building on the examples presented, the literature explored in the prior chapters,
and the theoretical arguments for the preceding hypotheses, an argument could be made
that shareholders will analyze all underlying aspects of secondary agency problems in
totality when forming perceptions and making conclusions about the proposed
acquisition. The Shareholder Inequity construct is a combined measure of the inherent
conflict among various owner groups regarding preferences for slack resources (i.e.,
Organizational Slack), the presence of shareholder blocks who had effective control or
who could influence those in control (i.e., Blockholder Power and Differential Control),
and the absence of even-handedness from the board in monitoring and preventing
expropriation by dominant shareholders (i.e., Absence of Board Neutrality). Firm owners,
who perceive Shareholder Inequity in a firm’s governance structure and practices, may
feel their preferences and goals are no longer in alignment with those of the firm (and
those of the dominant shareholders). Since investors account for all available information
and form perceptions that drive their reaction to announced acquisitions (Schijven & Hitt,
2012), they are likely to perceive less value in the firm stemming from the proposed
acquisition activity and act accordingly.
Therefore,
H5: Ceteris paribus, there will be negative market reactions to acquisition
announcements by firms with greater Shareholder Inequity.
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3.3.6 Unrelated Acquisitions
The term unrelated acquisition describes the purchase of a target in a different
industry (Lin, Officer, & Zou, 2011). The strategic decision, also termed diversification,
involves the acquisition of a firm with few complementary resources or overlapping
markets and therefore few, if any, potential resource synergies (Castaner & Kavadis,
2013). Without synergy the proposed acquisitions are difficult to justify in terms of
value-enhancing potential and therefore could lead to value destruction for the acquiring
firm’s shareholders (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Hoechle, Schmid, Walter, & Yermack, 2012;
Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny, 1990). In exploring alternative reasons for the frequency of
value-destroying acquisitions, research identified that unrelated acquisitions are
beneficial to managers and less-diversified shareholders, but value-destroying to welldiversified shareholders. For example, Alessandri and Seth (2014) found that managerialowners had different risk tolerances from non-managerial owners leading to conflicting
preferences for the level of relatedness of selected acquisition targets. Additionally,
family firms prefer diversifying acquisitions to reduce personal portfolio risk for family
owners (Miller et al., 2010). In fact, research has shown that certain blockholder styles
(e.g., growth intensive, financially aggressive) are influential in the adoption of firm
strategies such as engaging in diversifying acquisitions (Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009).
Industry similarity is highly related to investor perceptions concerning acquisition
premiums (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Investors use the relatedness of the acquisition to
evaluate the motivations of firm actors and react negatively to premium payments when
the acquisition is diversifying in nature (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Since diversifying
acquisitions offer extended benefits to some shareholders that are not valuable to all
shareholders (e.g., Chen & Young, 2010; Goranova et al., 2012; Miller et al., 2010), the
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shareholders that do not receive the additional benefits are likely to perceive the
announcement negatively (Schijven & Hitt, 2012).
Therefore,
H6: Ceteris paribus, there will be a greater negative market reaction to unrelated
acquisition announcements by firms with greater Shareholder Inequity.
Figure 3: Predicted Construct and Market Reaction Relationships

3.4 METHODOLOGY
3.4.1 Sample
The proposed population for the study consisted of all acquisitions announced
between January 1, 2004 and June 30, 2014 by publicly traded S&P 1500 U.S. firms,
excluding only the Utility (SIC headers 48 and 49) and Financial (SIC header 6) sectors
since they are highly regulated (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; Damaraju, Barney, &
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Makhija, 2014). The S&P 1500 index was chosen because it includes various market caps
of publicly traded firms to increase the generalizability of the findings (Alessandri &
Seth, 2014) and the most recent time span with available data was selected. A sample size
of approximately 1000 announcements was expected based on the average number of
acquisitions announced in the market that adhered to the limitations imposed on both the
stated population and the criteria noted below:
1.

The deal value disclosed in Capital IQ was more than $1 million and
was at least 1% of the acquirer’s market value of equity. The minimum
values were chosen to ensure that the transactions were economically
significant to the acquiring firm (Gaur, Malhotra, & Zhu, 2013;
Masulis, Wang, & Xie, 2009).

2.

The target had publicly available financials so that necessary details
were available in Capital IQ, Compustat, and CRSP (Aktas, De Bodt, &
Roll, 2011; Gaur et al., 2013).

The data collection process began with the sample selection explained in the prior
paragraph. The related acquisition announcements were identified in Capital IQ and
information was collected to calculate the amount of Shareholder Inequity in each
acquiring firm. The amount of missing data was greater than expected and led to the
exclusion of all announcements from 2004, 2005, and 2014. Corporate governance data
was unavailable for the earlier years and the announcement return data was unavailable
for events in 2014. The final sample included acquisitions announced between January 1,
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2006 and December 31, 2013, which resulted in a final dataset of 673 announcements
with 610 unique firm year combinations.13
The first goal for the study was the further validation of the new measure of
secondary agency conflict. Shareholder Inequity and the underlying dimensions,
Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board
Neutrality, were once again tested with the collected data to further establish model
stability and generalizability (Hair et al., 2010). The data for this chapter spanned
multiple years and therefore represented a time in which the firms were engaged in
significant strategic changes. Similar to the results of Chapter 2, the measurement and
structural models showed strong reliability and validity. The evaluation of the reflective
portion of the model showed that each construct exceeded the required level of .5 for the
AVE and the required level of .6 for the composite reliability; therefore offering evidence
of convergent and construct reliability (Hair et al., 2014). Table 13 illustrates the
abbreviation, AVE, and composite reliability of each construct.
Table 13: Abbreviation, AVE, and Composite Reliabilty
Construct
Organizational
Slack
Blockholder
Power
Differential
Control
Absence of Board
Neutrality

Abbreviation

AVE

Composite
Reliability

OrgSlack

.555

.694

BlockPower

.879

.935

DiffControl

.583

.719

AbsenceNeutralBOD .682

.810

Further testing confirmed that the constructs exhibited discriminant validity since
the relationships between the constructs are below the .9 requirement recommended in
13

Some firms in the sample had multiple announcements in the same year. Therefore, all independent
variables for the identified 63 announcements are the same for that firm and year except for the dependent
variable (CAR).
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the analysis of the Heterotrait-monotrait ratio (HTMT) (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarsdedt,
2014). The HTMT ratio was calculated through comparisons of the correlations of the
indicators across constructs and the correlations of indicators within the same construct
(Henseler, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). Financial slack (FinSlack) was found to be
negatively related to Differential Control with a value of -.049. However, the HTMT
values should be evaluated as absolute values and therefore all constructs met the
assessment requirements (Henseler, Ringle, & Sarsdedt, 2014.)
Table 14: Discriminant Validity Assessment
HTMT:
Construct
OrgSlack
OrgSlack

HTMT:
BlockPower

BlockPower

.141

DiffControl
AbsenceNeutralBO
D

-.049

.478

.416

.339

HTMT:
DiffControl

.588

Table 15 shows the results of the testing related to the formative portion of the
model. Similar to the model testing in Chapter 2, the path coefficients shown in the table
offer evidence that the dimensions contributed similarly to the Shareholder Inequity
construct. However, with these data, the Blockholder Power construct was slightly more
influential than the Differential Control and Absence of Board Neutrality constructs,
while the Organizational Slack construct still had the least influence. These findings are
not surprising or detrimental to the Shareholder Inequity model since no assumptions
were (or should be) made regarding the relative contributions of each underlying
dimension. Each dimension was still highly significant in the model and contributed
similarly. A t-test confirmed that no significant difference existed between the path
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coefficients in the Chapter 2 data and the path coefficients shown in Table 15.14 Further
testing offered evidence that the constructs exhibited acceptable levels of
multicollinearity since the VIF scores were below the threshold value of 5. Additionally
all underlying constructs exhibited significant relationships with the Shareholder Inequity
construct.
Table 15: Paths, Multicollinearity, and Significance
Construct
Path Coefficients
VIF

Significance

OrgSlack

.362

1.188

p<.0001

BlockPower

.440

1.231

p<.0001

DiffControl
AbsenceNeutralBO
D

.370

1.03

p<.0001

.395

1.154

p<.0001

Table 16 shows the loadings and significance of each measured variable. The
loadings were similar to the Chapter 2 results. The measured variables’ relative
contribution to their associated construct was the same and all loadings were above the
required .4 level, leading to the conclusion that the measured variables exhibited
significant relationships with their construct (Hair et al., 2014).
Table 16: Loadings and Significance
BlockPower

DiffControl

Absence
NeutralBOD

Construct

OrgSlack

Significance

DivPay

.934

p<.0001

FinSlack

.487

p<.0001

LargestBlock

.947

p<.0001

BlockDiff

.928

p<.0001

DualClass

.504

p<.0001

InsideOwn

.955

p<.0001

AffilDirector

.886

p<.0001

ModDuality

.761

p<.0001

14

T-value was .5144.

95
Once the model for secondary agency conflict was further validated with the new
dataset, the acquisition event study was the next step. The measures for Shareholder
Inequity and the underlying constructs15 were collected for the year prior to the
acquisition announcement to show that the levels of secondary agency conflict influence
acquisition decisions. Control variables that were included in related research were also
incorporated into the regression equations to further isolate the constructs of interest.16
The complete set of tested variables is presented in Appendix A and further explained in
the next section. Accounting data were collected from Compustat, stock return data from
CRSP, and acquisition data from Capital IQ; then matched by a unique identifier that
included the ticker symbol and announcement date.
3.4.2 Variables
Dependent variable.
The dependent variable, investor reaction, was operationalized as cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) over the course of a time period that extended from two days
prior to the announcement, the announcement day, and two days after the announcement
(Humphery-Jenner, 2014). The five-day CAR is the most commonly used time period
since it is short enough to avoid confounding events, but long enough to allow for
information leakage and reaction time (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). The following process
was used to calculate each event’s CAR (Chen & Young, 2010):
1. Collected the daily stock prices for each acquirer during the event window t−2
to t+2 (i.e., the announcement day, two days before, and two days after the
announcement).

15
16

As explained previously in Chapter 2 and below in the Independent Variables section.
All control variable descriptions and justifications are explained in section 3.4.2.
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2. Collected the CRSP equally-weighted return (from the standard market
model) to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (Brown & Warner,
1985). The announcement date was coded as t0 and the market model
parameters were estimated over the period from 210 days before to 11 days
before the announcement day to show the normal stock market price
fluctuations of the acquiring firm (Masulis et al., 2007).
3. Calculated the abnormal return each day for each acquiring firm j as:
ARj,t = Rj,t − (α + β × Rm,t),
Where: ARj,t was the abnormal return,
Rj,t was the acquiring firm’s daily stock return,
(α + β × Rm,t) represents the 200 (-210, -11) day holdout period,
Rm,t was the daily stock market return,
β was the beta or market-adjusted variance in firm stock returns,
α is the rate of return for the firm when Rm,t is 0
4. Summated the daily abnormal returns during the five-day period (−2, +2)
surrounding the acquisition announcement to get the CAR.
Independent variables.
The independent variables for the study (Organizational Slack, Blockholder
Power, Differential Control, and Absence of Board Neutrality) are the unobservable
constructs that were tested and validated for the preceding chapter. The constructs were
described at length in Chapter 2 and are summarized in Appendix A. Each of the
secondary agency constructs was operationalized as the latent variable score from the
CFA procedures explained in Chapter 2. The latent variable scores produced by the PLSSEM testing are the result of regression equations involving an exact linear combination
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of the related measured variables (Hair et al., 2014). The Organizational Slack construct
represents the differing shareholder preferences in a firm and is a composite of the firm’s
dividend payout ratio (Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2010) and the financial slack percentage
(Kim et al., 2008). Blockholder Power represents the influence of the blockholders in the
organization and is a composite of the percentage held by the largest shareholder
(Renders & Gaeremynck, 2012) and a dummy variable that represents the ownership
difference between the largest and second largest shareholders (Renders & Gaeremynck,
2012). Differential Control represents owners that have additional power over the
strategic direction of the firm and is a composite of a dual share class dummy (Renders &
Gaeremynck, 2012) and the percentage owned by insiders (Deutsch, Keil, & Laamanen,
2011). Absence of Board Neutrality represents the extent of bias for various owners that
hinder the monitoring capabilities of the board and is a composite of the percentage of
affiliated directors (Deutsch et al., 2011) and an extended CEO duality measure (Su, Xu,
& Phan, 2008). The Shareholder Inequity construct is a composite of each of the above
dimensions of secondary agency conflict that represents deviations from the one-share
one-vote conceptualization of firm ownership.
The moderating variable, unrelated acquisitions, was dummy coded for
objectivity and replicability (Miller et al., 2010). Unrelated, or diversifying acquisitions,
are transactions where the acquirer and target operate in different industries. Unrelated
acquisition was operationalized as a dummy variable coded 1 if 3-digit SIC codes (of the
acquirer and target firm) did not match or 0 if they did match (Miller et al., 2010).
Control variables.
The first set of control variables that were included represents primary agency
conflict. The inclusion of these measures is a critical component of this study since
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agency problems are of two types: primary and secondary. When the owner-manager
(primary) conflicts are controlled, the owner-owner (secondary) conflicts will still
remain. To control for primary agency conflicts, both the Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell
(BCF) index of six anti-takeover provisions (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Farrell, 2009;
Humphery-Jenner, 2014) and a dummy variable representing firms with classified boards
(Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2012) were included in the models. A firm’s BCF
score ranges from 0-6 and is an additive measure of the number of anti-takeover
provisions that the firm employs. Anti-takeover provision measures have been employed
in similar studies to proxy for managerial entrenchment and primary agency problems
(Masulis et al., 2007). Higher numbers of the anti-takeover provisions represent firms
with greater agency conflict (Harford et al., 2012; Masulis et al., 2007). The same studies
also employ a dummy variable that identifies the firm’s use of classified boards (to
protect managers from takeovers) to proxy for primary agency conflict (Bebchuk et al.,
2009).
Following extant literature, various accounting measures related to the acquiring
firm were also included as control variables (Masulis et al., 2007). The acquirer controls
included in the regressions were leverage, firm size, Tobin’s Q, and free cash flow.
Leverage, firm size, Tobin’s Q, and free cash flow were also measured at the fiscal yearend prior to the acquisition announcement (Harford et al., 2012). Leverage was the book
value of total debt divided by the market value of total assets. Masulis et al. (2007)
showed leverage to have a positive effect on CAR and suggested that the effect stems
from the limited managerial discretion and the protections from takeovers when firms are
highly leveraged. Firm size was measured as the log of the number of employees (Luo,
Kanuri, & Andrews, 2013) and was controlled because Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz
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(2004) provided evidence that the bidder’s size was negatively related to their M&A
announcement CAR. Tobin’s Q was measured as the ratio of the acquirer’s market value
of assets over its book value of assets and was expected to be negatively related to the
CAR (Masulis et al., 2007). Controls were also established for the amount of free cash
flow available to firm decision makers since the market reacts more negatively to firms
with more cash on hand (Masulis et al., 2007). The free cash flow variable was
operationalized as the firm’s cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets
(Kim & Bettis, 2014).
Additional controls were added for firm acquisition strategies and the details of
the announced acquisition. The first was the year of the announcement (Masulis et al.,
2007). The form of payment proposed by the acquiring firm has also been shown to
influence the announcement reactions (Masulis et al., 2007). Acquisitions financed with
firm equity experience greater negative reaction than cash payments for the transaction.
Therefore, a dummy variable was included for payment terms, coded as 1 for all cash
payments and 0 otherwise (Masulis et al., 2007). Additional evidence shows different
investor reactions in regard to the type of target (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Shareholders
tend to react more positively to acquisitions of private firms (Harford et al., 2012).
Therefore a dummy variable was included to account for this detail; coded as 1 for
private targets and 0 if public. The relationship between the acquirer and the target is also
a consideration for shareholders. Investors prefer a friendly relationship between the
acquiring and target firms over a hostile situation and therefore a dummy variable was
included that was coded as 1 for friendly relationships and 0 otherwise (Goranova et al.,
2010). The frequency of acquisitions within a given firm was also controlled since
research has shown that certain firms pursue acquisitions as a strategic growth strategy
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and their shareholders would be less likely to have negative reactions to announced
acquisitions (Aktas et al., 2011; Laamanen & Keil, 2008). The variable was coded as 1
when the acquirer averaged more than one announced acquisition per year within the
sample period and 0 otherwise (Laamanen & Keil, 2008). The relative size of the
announced acquisition also factors into the market reaction. When the announced
acquisition requires a larger percentage of firm resources, investors more frequently
question the value of the decision (Masulis et al., 2007). The relative size of the
announced acquisition was measured as the deal value in proportion to the market value
of equity (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). The industry relatedness, at the 3-digit SIC code, of
the acquirer and target was also included as a dummy variable coded 1 if the codes were
different and 0 if they were the same (Miller et al., 2010).17 Acquisition announcements
that are diversifying in nature are viewed more negatively by shareholders (Masulis et al.,
2007). Lastly, the regressions included a high-tech dummy variable for announcements
involving two high-tech firms;18 coded as 1 when both target and acquiring firms were
technology related and 0 when not (Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Loughran & Ritter, 2004).
When two high-tech firms are involved in an acquisition announcement, there exists a
positive effect on CAR (Masulis et al., 2007). The summary of variables included in the
statistical testing are presented in Appendix 1, but the abbreviations and summary
statistics for the employed variables are shown in Table 17. The independent variables
(Organizational Slack, Blockholder Power, Differential Control, Absence of Board
17

The industry relatedness has no hypothesized relationships in the first five regressions. Instead, it is
included only as a control variable (Humphery-Jenner, 2014; Miller et al., 2010). In Hypothesis 6, the
industry relatedness is tested more directly as an interaction with Shareholder Inequity.
18
Loughran and Ritter (2004) define high-tech firms as firms in the following industry SIC codes:
computer hardware (3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578); communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669);
electronics (3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and
controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone
equipment (4812, 4813); communications services (4899); and software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375,
7378, 7379).
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Neutrality, and Shareholder Inequity) are not included in Table 17 because latent variable
scores produced from PLS-SEM have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. There
was no missing data in the final dataset and therefore the n is 673 for all variables.
Table 17: Summary Statistics of Measured Variables
Variable
Abbreviation
Mean
Cumulative
abnormal return
Agency index

Std. Deviation

CAR

-.001

.012

BCF

2.570

1.317

Classified Board

CLASSBOD

.450

.498

Tobin’s Q

TOBINQ

2.076

1.012

Leverage

LEV

.280

.160

Firm size

FIRMSIZE

2.262

1.719

Free cash flow

FCF

.194

.168

Payment method

PAYCASH

.590

.492

Target type

BUYPRIV

.940

.242

Deal attitude

FRIEND

.980

.143

SERACQ

.400

.490

RELDEALSZ

.297

.545

DIVERSE3

.560

.497

Announcement
pattern of acquirer
Relative deal size
Diversifying

The correlations between the most important measures are presented in Table 18
and a full correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 2. All of the dimensions of
secondary agency conflict and the composite Shareholder Inequity measure were
negatively correlated with the announcement returns except for Organizational Slack.
The positive correlation may be explained by the need to retain larger amounts of liquid
assets (fewer dividend payouts and more financial slack) leading up to a time of strategic
change (Uysal, 2011). The correlation between Differential Control and CAR was
significant at the .01 level. The interaction term of Shareholder Inequity and diversifying
acquisitions (Unrelated) was also significantly correlated with the dependent variable,
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CAR. The findings offer preliminary evidence of statistical relationships with CAR. Also
interesting was the negative correlation between several of the secondary agency
constructs and the primary agency proxies.19 The negative correlations imply a possible
trade-off between primary agency and secondary agency problems. Additionally, Table
18 offers further evidence that Shareholder Inequity has a significant relationship with
each underlying dimension. To avoid statistical problems resulting from the high
correlations between the secondary agency dimensions and Shareholder Inequity, each
construct was tested in separate regressions in order to assess the resulting market
reactions. The high correlations between Shareholder Inequity (and some underlying
dimensions) as well as the Unrelated variable in the table is a consequence of the
construction of the variable for the interactions tested in Hypothesis 6.
Table 18: Correlations of Focus Variables:
Block
Power

.057

1

.

-.006

.090*

1

-.140**

.044

.334**

1

-.071

.160**

.246**

.348**

1

-.062

.481**

.693**

.671**

.690**

1

-.083*

.321**

.482**

.578**

.530**

.751**

1

BCF

.003

-.009

-.094*

-.172**

.004

-.107**

-.066

1

CLASS
BOD

-.065

-.014

-.021

.022

.062

.018

.015

.533**

CAR
Org
Slack
Block
Power
Diff
Control
Absence
Neutral
BOD
Share
Inequity
Un
Related

Diff
Control

Absence
Neutral
BOD

Org
Slack

CAR

Share
Inequity

Un
Related

BCF

1
.

**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) and *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

19

ANOVA analysis offered further evidence that proxies for primary agency were significantly different
from the composite measures of secondary agency (F-value of 2.040 for BCF and 1.741 for Classified
Board) and from Shareholder Inequity at the p<.0001 level.
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3.4.3 Analyses
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was employed to test each of the
proposed hypotheses. OLS is still the most frequently used technique in management
research (Wiersema & Bowen, 2009) and is appropriate for statistical models with
continuous dependent variables (Hair et al., 2010). OLS estimations predict the
dependent variable, investor reaction (CAR), for each observation in the data by setting
regression weights to minimize residuals. OLS regression provides a single predicted
value of the dependent variable regardless of the number of independent variables so that
all of the individual and cumulative effects will be manifested.
The predictive power (R2) of the models was low when compared to the majority
of published studies in management literature, but comparable to other short- term market
event studies (Chen & Young, 2012; Duchin & Schmidt, 2013; Humphrey-Jenner, 2014;
Masulis et al., 2007). The efficient market hypothesis explains that the market is simply
unpredictable (Fama, 1970) and therefore “the low R2 in many tests of short-run market
efficiency are neither surprising nor interesting” (Schiller, 2014, p. 1491). Any stock
return predictability, no matter how low, represents opportunities to “beat” the market
and is therefore relevant and useful (Schiller, 2014).
The first tested equations, Hypotheses 1 and 2, involved the isolation of the
Organizational Slack and Blockholder Power dimensions of secondary agency problems
and the associated control variables. The regression results are shown in Table 19.
Hypothesis 1, which explained the relationship between Organizational Slack and CAR,
was not significant. Since the Organizational Slack construct includes measures for the
dividend payout ratio and financial slack, an argument could be made that shareholders
believed that the firm retained those slack resources in order to pursue available
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opportunities (Kim et al., 2008). Similar findings regarding free cash flows have been
presented in the primary agency literature. For example, Masulis et al. (2007) found a
positive relationship between available cash and announcement returns and explained that
higher free cash flows can proxy for better recent firm performance and indicate that the
firm is pursuing valuable opportunities as opposed to expropriating minority shareholder
wealth. Therefore, Organizational Slack may not represent a problem to shareholders
during times of strategic change unless the high slack levels are combined with the other
dimensions of secondary agency conflict.
Hypothesis 2, which explained the relationship between Blockholder Power and
CAR, was found to be insignificant as well. The Blockholder Power construct included
measures for the largest shareholder and the differential between the largest and second
largest shareholders. As explained by Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009), certain types of
blockholders and those with managerial or board control are more likely to manipulate
policies or changes. In the absence of the other dimensions of secondary agency conflict,
Blockholder Power may not be sufficient to expropriate wealth.
In addition, the findings related to Hypotheses 1 and 2 may show evidence of the
trade-off that shareholders experience between primary and secondary agency conflicts
(Edmans, 2013). In both models the classified board dummy (CLASSBOD) that
represented primary agency conflict was negative and significant. The Organizational
Slack and Blockholder Power dimensions alone were viewed negatively by shareholders,
but were less influential than primary agency measures on the dependent variable, CAR.
This suggested that shareholders were more concerned about managerial expropriation
than blockholder expropriation when the first two dimensions of secondary agency
conflict were evaluated in isolation.
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Of the remaining included control variables, only the free cash flow (FCF), the
relative deal size (RELDEALSZ), and the high-tech firm dummy (HIGHTECH) were
significant in the equations. The control variables that represented the acquirer’s
characteristics had mixed results. Leverage and firm size (while not being significant)
performed as expected. Greater levels of debt had a positive effect on CAR and firm size
was negatively related to CAR. The effects of Tobin’s Q and free cash flow were
opposite to that predicted. The relationships between CAR and Tobin’s Q were expected
to be negative based on the Masulis et al. (2007) study. But, more recent studies have
shown a positive relationship with CAR (Humphery-Jenner, 2014). Since Tobin’s Q and
free cash flow both represent the availability of growth opportunities, presumably
shareholders feel more comfortable with acquisitions announced when there are available
resources (Peng, Wei, & Yang, 2011). Although different than expected, the free cash
flow directionality aligns with findings from similar research (Masulis et al., 2007).
The relationships of relative deal size (RELDEALSIZE) and the high-tech
identifier (HIGHTECH) were significant and the directionality was as expected. The
directionality of the payment type (PAYCASH) and target type (BUYPRIV) control
variables was the opposite of predictions. Findings from Masulis et al., 2009 offer
evidence that the interaction of payment type and target type determines the
directionality. Investor reactions to announcements involving the acquisition of a private
company and financed with stock are viewed positively, but the acquisition of a private
company with cash produces a negative reaction (Masulis et al., 2009). Schijven and Hitt
(2012) showed that acquisitions financed with cash changed the relationship between
acquisition premiums and CAR, suggesting that the acquisition premium (not measured
in this study) may be important to correctly analyze the effects of payment type.
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Humphery-Jenner (2014) showed that industry had an effect on the relationship between
the type of firm and the market reaction to acquisition announcements. Specifically,
investors reacted negatively when the target was a private high-tech firm (HumpheryJenner, 2014). Neither payment type nor target type were significant in the equations. The
control variables addressing the other deal characteristics: announcement year
(ANNCYR), serial acquisition strategy (SERACQ), attitude (FRIENDLY), and
diversification (DIVERSE3), performed as predicted from prior research (as explained
previously in the description of control variables). The base model and regression
outcomes for the hypothesized relationships explained above are shown in Table 19.
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Table 19: Regression Results for Hypotheses 1 and 2
Base Model
Hypothesis 1
Beta

T-Value

OrgSlack
BlockPower
(Constant)
BCF
CLASSBOD
TOBINQ

Hypothesis 2

Beta

T-Value Beta

-.002

-.050

T-Value

-.021

-.540

.045
-.078
.055

1.482
.978
-1.685*
1.076

.048
-.078
.053

1.426
1.051
-1.693*
1.043

.048
-.078
.053

1.425
1.015
-1.702*
1.027

LEV
FIRMSIZE
FCF
ANNCYR

.068
-.018
.097
-.057

1.202
-.380
2.045**
-1.434

.068
-.019
.097
-.057

1.204
-.367
1.980**
-1.449

.069
-.020
.096
-.059

1.218
-.420
2.027**
-1.490

PAYCASH
BUYPRIV
FRIEND
SERACQ
RELDEALSZ

-.044
-.054
.019
.011
-.076

-1.021
-1.362
.475
.253
-1.748*

-.044
-.054
.019
.011
-.076

-1.025
-1.363
.458
.256
-1.743*

-.046
-.054
.019
.009
-.075

-1.047
-1.350
.472
.219
-1.742*

DIVERSE3
BOTHTECH

-.030
.082

-.748
1.971**

-.030
.082

-.865
-.030
2.014** .082

-.754
1.985**

1.986**
4.365
2.249
.000

2.019**
4.446
2.224
.000

F-Value
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2

2.131***
4.364
2.329

Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p <
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.

Hypothesis 3, which explained the relationship between Differential Control and
CAR, had a significant and negative relationship as predicted. These results are provided
in Table 20. The Differential Control dimension of secondary agency conflict was a
composite of insider ownership and dual class shares. The variables in the regression
equation explained 6.1% of the market reaction to an acquisition announcement and
resulted in a T-Value of -3.462, which represented significance with a p-value of less
than .0001. These findings showed that shareholders reacted negatively to acquirers that
exhibited greater levels of the Differential Control dimension of secondary agency.
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Additionally, the results also suggested that shareholders may view the Differential
Control dimension of secondary agency conflicts as being more detrimental than primary
agency problems in an acquisition announcement context.
Hypothesis 4, which tested the relationship between the Absence of Board
Neutrality and CAR, was also negative and significant. The Absence of Board Neutrality
dimension was a composite of the percentage of affiliated directors and a modified
duality measure that incorporated both the ownership and board positions of the firm’s
CEO. The variables in this regression equation explained 5.225% of the market reaction
to an acquisition announcement and resulted in a T-Value of -2.401, which represented
significance with a p-value of .017. Similarly to the effects of the Differential Control
dimension described earlier, shareholders had negative reactions to firms that exhibited
greater levels of the Absence of Board Neutrality dimension of secondary agency
conflict. Also notable was that once again, primary agency concerns appeared less
influential than secondary agency conflicts when acquisitions were announced.
The control variables again exhibited the same directionality and similar levels of
influence on the market reaction to announced acquisitions that were described in the
earlier section explaining Hypotheses 1 and 2. One notable exception involved the
significance of relative deal size (RELDEALSIZE), suggesting that the deal size became
less important to shareholders when they believed that secondary agency conflicts may
have played a part in the strategic decision to acquire. Additionally, the constant and
announcement year (ANNCYR) became significant in Hypothesis 4 regression. This may
represent the changing trends in board structure over the time period studied, but further
investigation would be necessary to fully determine the underlying reasons for this
change. Table 20 shows the regression results of the base model and the regressions
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related to the Differential Control and the Absence of Board Neutrality dimensions of
secondary agency conflict.
Table 20: Regression Results for Hypotheses 3 and 4
Base Model
Hypothesis 3
Beta
T-Value
Beta
T-Value
DiffControl
AbsenceNeutralBOD

-.137

Hypothesis 4
Beta
T-Value

3.462***
-.101

(Constant)

1.426

1.549

-2.401**
1.784*

BCF
CLASSBOD
TOBINQ
LEV
FIRMSIZE
FCF
ANNCYR
PAYCASH
BUYPRIV

.048
-.078
.053
.068
-.018
.097
-.057
-.044
-.054

1.051
-1.693*
1.043
1.202
-.380
2.045**
-1.434
-1.021
-1.362

.011
-.061
.048
.050
-.031
.083
-.060
-.049
-.045

.208
-1.332
.938
.883
-.608
1.770*
-1.555
-1.153
-1.134

.038
-.076
.052
.058
-.056
.089
-.071
-.046
-.045

.834
-1.659*
1.018
1.034
-1.110
1.888*
-1.790*
-1.067
-1.143

FRIEND
SERACQ
RELDEALSZ
DIVERSE3
BOTHTECH

.019
.011
-.076
-.030
.082

.475
.253
-1.748*
-.748
1.971**

.019
.004
-.068
-.022
.088

.464
.089
-1.597
-.551
2.144**

.015
.011
-.070
-.020
.087

.393
.266
-1.617
-.496
2.100**

F-Value
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2

2.131***
4.364
2.329

2.821***
6.100
3.957

2.388***
5.225
3.044

1.736

0.821

Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p <
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.

The next regression equation included all the prior controls and the new
composite measure of secondary agency conflict, Shareholder Inequity. These results are
presented in Table 21. Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative and significant relationship
between the market reaction to an announced acquisition and secondary agency conflicts.
As expected, the relationship between Shareholder Inequity and CAR was negative and
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significant at the .01 level. The regression equation explained 5.337% of the variation in
the market reaction.
Considering that the market is unpredictable (Fama, 1970), the contribution of
secondary agency conflicts to the market reaction of announced acquisitions is both
statistically and economically significant. The regression results show that, on average,
acquirers that exhibited the characteristics associated with greater secondary agency
problems had announcement returns that were approximately 1.1% lower than those that
did not. Masulis et al. (2007) offered evidence that firms exhibiting primary agency
characteristics experienced a .524% lower return, which represented a $30 million loss of
shareholder value. The regressions tested in this study showed that the contribution of
secondary agency problems to the market reaction may represent double that amount
(i.e., after controlling for the effects of primary agency issues).
The significance of Shareholder Inequity showed that secondary agency concerns
involved a combination of dimensions. Some of the dimensions (OrgSlack and
BlockPower) were not significant alone, but became highly significant when shareholders
believed they were combined with greater blockholder control over firm decisions
(DiffControl and AbsenceNeutralBOD). This finding further validates the necessity of a
measure that encompasses all dimensions. Table 21 shows the results of the regression
analysis.
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Table 21: Regression Results for Hypothesis 5
Base Model
Beta

T-Value

(Constant)
BCF
CLASSBOD
TOBINQ
LEV

Hypothesis 5
Beta
-.109

T-Value
-2.589***

.048
-.078
.053
.068

1.426
1.051
-1.693*
1.043
1.202

.025
-.072
.051
.061

1.759*
.528
-1.571
1.009
1.076

FIRMSIZE
FCF
ANNCYR
PAYCASH

-.018
.097
-.057
-.044

-.380
2.045**
-1.434
-1.021

-.053
.102
-.070
-.049

-1.053
2.166**
-1.765*
-1.140

BUYPRIV
FRIEND
SERACQ
RELDEALSZ
DIVERSE3

-.054
.019
.011
-.076
-.030

-1.362
.475
.253
-1.748*
-.748

-.046
.016
.007
-.069
-.024

-1.162
.408
.177
-1.606
-.602

BOTHTECH

.082

1.971**
2.131***
4.364
2.329

.091

2.190**

ShareInequity

F-Value
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2

2.469***
5.337
3.175
1.000

Notes: In the model presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p <
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.

Hypothesis 6 examined the impact of acquisition relatedness (measured at the 3digit SIC code) on the shareholder returns (i.e., CAR) of firms exhibiting secondary
agency problems, represented by the new Shareholder Inequity measure. The interaction
of Shareholder Inequity and DIVERSE3 was predicted to be negatively related to
announcement returns. The relationship between the interaction term, Unrelated (i.e.,
DIVERSE3 X ShareInequity), and CAR in the regression, while negative, was not
significant as expected. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 did not receive support as shown in
Table 22.
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Table 22: Regression Results for Hypothesis 6
Model Before
Base Model
Interaction
Beta
T-Value Beta
T-Value
Unrelated
(Constant)
BCF
CLASSBOD
TOBINQ
LEV

Hypothesis 6
Beta

T-Value

-.062

-1.057

.025
-.073
.049
.056

1.720*
.543
-1.585
.955
.983

.048
-.078
.053
.068

1.426
1.051
-1.693*
1.043
1.202

.025
-.072
.051
.061

1.759*
.528
-1.571
1.009
1.076

FIRMSIZE
FCF
ANNCYR
PAYCASH
BUYPRIV
FRIEND
SERACQ
RELDEALSZ

-.018
.097
-.057
-.044
-.054
.019
.011
-.076

-.380
2.045**
-1.434
-1.021
-1.362
.475
.253
-1.748*

-.053
.102
-.070
-.049
-.046
.016
.007
-.069

-1.053
2.166**
-1.765*
-1.140
-1.162
.408
.177
-1.606

-.053
.100
-.068
-.050
-.046
.015
.007
-.068

-1.059
2.133**
-1.725*
-1.149
-1.169
.370
.166
-1.574

BOTHTECH
DIVERSE3

.082
-.030

1.971**
-.748

-.109
-.024

-2.190**
-.602

.086
-.025

2.064**
-.623

-.109

-2.589***

-.063

-1.037

ShareInequity
F-Value
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2

2.131**
*
4.364
2.329

2.453***
5.300
3.090
1.736

2.370**
*
5.500
3.245
0.821

Notes: In the models presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p <
.05, *** p < .01, respectively.

However, the relationship was visually examined by plotting the regression
between CAR and Shareholder Inequity under two varying conditions of diversification
relatedness, related or unrelated. The trends in the two plots (shown in Figure 4) offered
some evidence of the hypothesized relationships. As is evident from the two plots, the
slopes of both the lines are negative. Therefore, shareholder returns (i.e., CAR) decreased
with increased Shareholder Inequity when company announced diversifying acquisitions
(i.e., regardless of whether the diversification was related or unrelated). Moreover, as the
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different slopes of the two plots in Figure 4 indicated, this decrease in CAR was greater
when the firm was pursuing unrelated diversification (as compared to related
diversification). This result provided visual confirmation of the relationships proposed in
Hypothesis 6.
Figure 4: Acquisition Relatedness and Shareholder Inequity
3
2

CAR

1

Related
0

Unrelated
-1
-2
-3

Low Shareholder Inequity

High Shareholder Inequity

Several additional tests and robustness checks were incorporated into the analysis.
The results were robust to multicollinearity. The tolerance and VIF levels were checked
in each equation and the values for all variables were below the acceptable limits. The Tstatistics presented are based on standard errors that have been adjusted for
heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). The reported findings held when the sample was tested
without the duplicate firm-years (610 remaining). The findings also held when a control
variable was added that differentiates whether the sampled announcement is the first or
second for the firm in the same year.
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The relationships were also tested using a different analytical method, PLS-SEM.
The results held for all hypotheses with both methods. Additionally, the results held when
all hypotheses were retested with a different event window for announcement returns.
The dependent variable, CAR was re-calculated with a 3-day event window (-1, 1) and
the hypotheses were re-tested arriving at the same conclusions. The dimensions
(independent variables) of secondary agency conflict were represented by the latent
variable scores that were created with PLS-SEM and then used in regression equations
both independently and holistically through the Shareholder Inequity construct. The
interaction variable, that multiplied the Shareholder Inequity construct and the
diversifying dummy variable, was tested employing both a 2-digit and 3-digit SIC code to
measure diversification. None of the results for any of the six hypotheses (1-6) changed
from the robustness analyses.
Additional testing was performed to compare the new Shareholder Inequity
measure with Renders and Gaeremynck’s (2012) conflict index. The factor score for the
conflict index is significantly correlated, .7210, with Shareholder Inequity. Since there
existed significant correlation, further regression testing was deemed important to
illustrate the difference between the two measures of secondary agency problems. The
regression testing showed that while Shareholder Inequity is significantly related to CAR,
the conflict index is not. The regression results employing the two different measures are
presented in Table 23.
Table 23: Regression Results for Shareholder Inequity and the Conflict Index
Shareholder Inequity
Conflict Index
ShareInequity
Conflict Index
(Constant)

Beta
-.109

T-Value
-2.589***
1.759*

Beta

T-Value

-.030

-.757
1.513
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BCF
CLASSBOD
TOBINQ
LEV
FIRMSIZE
FCF
ANNCYR
PAYCASH
BUYPRIV

.025
-.072
.051
.061
-.053
.102
-.070
-.049
-.046

.528
-1.571
1.009
1.076
-1.053
2.166**
-1.765*
-1.140
-1.162

.942
-1.680*
1.088
1.225
-.440
2.021**
-1.521
-1.062
-1.342

FRIEND
SERACQ
RELDEALSZ
DIVERSE3
BOTHTECH

.016
.007
-.069
-.024
.091

.408
.177
-1.606
-.602
2.190**

.469
.214
-1.739*
-.758
1.992**

2.469***
5.337
3.175
1.000

2.131***
4.421
2.213
1.000

F-Value
R2
Adjusted R2
Change in R2

Notes: In the model presented, the dependent variable is CAR. Statistical significance is indicated as: * p < .10, ** p <
.05, *** p < .01, respectively. The change in R2 shown in this table represents the difference from the base model.

3.5 SUMMARY, CONTRIBUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
3.5.1 Summary
This chapter discussed the first empirical tests of the new secondary agency
constructs that were identified, defined, and analyzed in the first two chapters of this
dissertation. The final step for validation of new constructs was to apply them to a
specific context as reported in the current chapter (Hair et al., 2010). The research
reported in Chapter 3 produced results that further established the validity of the overall
measure of Shareholder Inequity. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were rejected, but evidence was
presented that when used in combination with the other dimensions, Shareholder Inequity
produced significant relationships. Tests of Hypotheses 3 and 5 both indicated
significance at the p<.01 level and Hypothesis 4 at the p<.05 level. Hypothesis 6 was not
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statistically supported, but the visual evidence presented allows for a greater
understanding of the relationships. The interaction variable was not significant, but the
regression plots showed that unrelated diversification augmented the negative
relationship between CAR and Shareholder Inequity.
3.5.2 Contributions
The study presented above further validated the composite measure, Shareholder
Inequity, which is an important contribution to research that has sought to investigate the
latent conflicts among principals. The insignificance of some dimensions when tested
alone offers further evidence of the necessity of employing a composite measure to fully
assess secondary agency conflicts in a firm. Additional testing showed that a prior
measure of secondary agency problems was significantly correlated with Shareholder
Inequity, but was not significant in the regression equations.
A few previous studies have investigated the problems among certain types of
principals and their involvement in acquisition activities, but they did not examine all of
the dimensions of secondary agency problems in combination (e.g., Chen & Young,
2010; Goranova et al., 2010; Miller et al., 2010). The conflicts among certain types of
owners have been examined in acquisition contexts, but they were limited to family
(Miller et al., 2010), institutions (Goranova et al., 2010), and government (Chen &
Young, 2010) blockholders. These earlier studies of secondary agency conflict produced
important findings, but the minority shareholders in a firm had not been included to
examine the conflicts holistically. The study presented here offers findings related to
many shareholder types, including minority owners.
The study also contributes to the knowledge surrounding event studies that
incorporate market reactions to acquisition announcement perceptions. The regression
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results offered evidence that investors acted on the new information provided by the
decision to acquire and the details of the acquisition (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Investors
clearly recognized and accounted for secondary agency conflicts in firms and exhibited a
particularly strong reaction to firms that had differential control structures and director
biases. Additionally, the composite measure that included all the facets of secondary
agency problems was associated with a significant negative market reaction to acquisition
announcements. When the announced acquisition was diversifying in nature, and
therefore more likely to destroy shareholder value, there was some evidence that firms
with secondary agency problems were more likely to experience a reduction in stock
price.
In contrast to the historical assumptions that all owners pursued profit
maximization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the research presented here offered evidence
that firm owners often had conflicting goals and were not always solely focused on
enhancing firm value (Young et al., 2008). Additional evidence produced some
preliminary insights as to relationship between primary and secondary agency conflicts.
Shareholder Inequity and the BCF index (representative of primary agency conflicts)
were significantly negatively correlated, showing some evidence of a trade-off.
Regression results showed that managers of publicly listed firms may not be
choosing strategy independently as assumed in primary agency research (Masulis et al.,
2007). Instead, investors may believe that blockholders with additional control were
driving acquisition strategy and that the board of directors may not be fully representing
the interests of all shareholders equally (Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Villalonga & Amit,
2009). While the evidence is not conclusive, the regressions that employed the same set
of controls used in similar primary agency research (Masulis et al., 2007; 2009) showed
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that secondary agency conflict may be more important to shareholders in the context of
acquisition announcements.
The research offers some practical insights as well. Investors should be aware of
the conflicting goals and interests among shareholders in publicly traded firms.
Shareholders should attempt to identify the firms that exhibit characteristics of secondary
agency conflict and perhaps more carefully monitor their individual goal alignment with
those of the blockholders who may influence or control firm decisions. Similarly, they
should also note that blockholders’ relationships with board members may impact firm
strategies.
3.5.3 Limitations and Future Research
There are a few limitations of this study. Each limitation has a corresponding
extension suggested for future research. As noted in the prior chapter, many studies
encourage researchers to consider the “type” of owner or group of owners (e.g., Chen &
Young, 2010; Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach, 2009). Ownership type was not considered in
the acquisition announcement models as it was beyond the scope of the dissertation.
Hence, an extension of this research that includes ownership type is encouraged. For
instance, researchers could investigate these phenomena in family firms, institutionallyowned firms, or firms with various other ownership structures.
This study only investigated the short term market reaction to acquisition
announcements. Future research that considers how the conflicts among principals affect
the post-acquisition integration process and long-term performance would be valuable
and interesting as well.
The conclusions presented are limited to publicly traded firms in the U.S. Future
research could examine acquisition behavior in other countries that have different
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ownership structures, laws, and political pressures. As noted in the Methods section
above, the correlations between primary and secondary agency may indicate trade-offs
between the two types of agency problems and research into these relationships should
also be encouraged.
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Appendix A
Variable Description Reference
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Moderating
Primary Agency
Controls

Financial
Controls

20

Variable Name20
Acquirer
Return
Organizational
Slack

Variable Label
CAR
OrgSlack

Measure
Five-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points
from t-2 through t+2)
Latent variable score from the CFA of dividend payout
ratio and financial slack
Latent variable score from the CFA of the % held by the
largest shareholder and a dummy representing the
differential between the top two blockholders
Latent variable score from the CFA of dual class dummy
and % owned by insiders

Data Source

Reference

CRSP

Masulis et al.
(2007)

Compustat

Chapter 2

Capital IQ

Chapter 2

Compustat

Chapter 2

Corporate
Library and
Capital IQ

Chapter 2

Blockholder
Power

BlockPower

Differential
Control

DiffControl

Absence of
Board Neutrality

AbsenceNeutralBOD

Latent variable score from the CFA of % affiliated
directors and the modified duality measure

ShareInequity

Latent variable score from the CFA of the underlying
dimensions

Unrelated

Diverse3*ShareInequity

Compustat

Miller et al. (2010)

BCF

BCF Index

Capital IQ

Humphery-Jenner
(2014)

Primary
Agency*

CLASSBOD

Dummy variable: 1 for classified board, 0 if not

Capital IQ

Harford et al.
(2012)

Tobin’s Q

TOBINQ

Market Value of Assets/Book Value of Assets

Compustat

Masulis et al.
(2007)

Shareholder
Inequity
Unrelated
Acquisition
Primary
Agency

Measured control variables that were changed or added are marked with an asterisk.

Chapter 2
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Deal Controls

Leverage

LEV

Book value of Debt/Market value of Assets

Compustat

Firm Size*

FIRMSIZE

Ln of the # of Employees

Compustat

FCF

Cash and Short Term Investments/Total Assets

Compustat

ANNCYR

Year of acquisition announcement

Capital IQ

Dummy variable: 1 for all cash, 0 otherwise

Capital IQ

BUYPRIV

Dummy Variable: 1 when target is a private firm and 0 if
the target is a public firm
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Dummy Variable: 1 when the deal is friendly and 0 if not
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Dummy variable: 1 if average more than 1 acquisition per
year and 0 if not
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Deal Value/Market Value of Equity

Capital IQ
Compustat

Masulis et al.
(2007)
Luo, Kanuri, &
Andrews (2013)
Kim & Bettis
(2014)
Masulis et al.
(2007)
Masulis et al.
(2007)
Masulis et al.
(2007)
Goranova et al.
(2010)
Laamanen& Keil
(2008)
Masulis et al.
(2007)

DiversifyingThree Digit SIC*

DIVERSE3

Dummy Variable: 1 when target and acquirer have
different 3-digit SIC codes and 0 if not
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Involving Tech
Firms*

BOTHTECH
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Free Cash
Flow*
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Year*
Payment
Type
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Serial
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Loughran and Ritter (2004) define high-tech firms as firms in the following industry SIC codes: computer hardware (3571, 3572, 3575, 3577, 3578);
communications equipment (3661, 3663, 3669); electronics (3671, 3672, 3674, 3675, 3677, 3678, 3679); navigation equipment (3812); measuring and
controlling devices (3823, 3825, 3826, 3827, 3829); medical instruments (3841, 3845); telephone equipment (4812, 4813); communications services (4899);
and software (7371, 7372, 7373, 7374, 7375, 7378, 7379).
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Appendix B
Full Correlation Matrix
CAR
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Control
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**Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed) and *Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
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